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SYMPOSIUM
WHO MAKES ESG?: UNDERSTANDING
STAKEHOLDERS IN THE ESG DEBATE
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Matthew Dilleri
Dean and Paul Fuller Professor of Law, Fordham Law Schooli
† This symposium was hosted virtually by Fordham University School of Law on
October 23, 2020. The transcript has been edited for clarity and to provide sources,
references, and explanatory materials for certain statements made by the speakers.
i. Matthew Diller is dean of Fordham Law School and the Paul Fuller Professor
of Law. He is one of the nation’s leading voices on access to justice issues and a
prominent scholar of social welfare law and policy. Dean Diller has lectured and
written extensively on the legal dimensions of social welfare policy, including public
assistance, Social Security, and disability programs, and on disability law and policy.
His articles have appeared in the Yale Law Journal, UCLA Law Review, NYU Law
Review, Fordham Law Review, Texas Law Review, and Michigan Law Review, among
other publications, and he is widely cited as an expert by the media, including The New
York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, and the
National Law Journal. He has taught a range of law school classes, including Civil
Procedure, Administrative Law, Social Welfare Law, and Public Interest Law. In
addition to his work as an administrator and scholar, Dean Diller is a member of the
New York State Permanent Commission on Access to Justice and is chair of the
commission’s Committee on Law School Involvement. He also serves on the board of
The Legal Aid Society of New York and is co-chair of the Council on the Profession at
the New York City Bar Association, where he has served as a vice president and
member of the executive committee. In addition, Dean Diller is a member of the
Judicial Institute on Professionalism in the Law and a fellow of the American Bar
Foundation. He has also served on the boards of Legal Services NYC, where he was
vice chair, the National Center for Law and Economic Justice, and Volunteers of Legal
Service. Dean Diller received an A.B. and a J.D., both magna cum laude, from Harvard
University, where he was an editor of the Harvard Law Review. After clerking for the
Honorable Walter R. Mansfield of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Dean Diller worked as a staff attorney in the civil appeals and law reform unit of The
Legal Aid Society from 1986 to 1993. Dean Diller began his teaching career at
Fordham Law in 1993 and was named the Cooper Family Professor of Law and codirector of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics. From 2003 to 2008, he served as
the associate dean for academic affairs. Prior to being appointed dean of Fordham Law
in 2015, he served as dean at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law from 2009 to
2015. Widely recognized by the legal community and beyond, Dean Diller has received
numerous awards for his work and scholarship. In 1991, The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York honored him with a legal services award. In 2014, the AALS
Section on Pro Bono and Public Service Opportunities awarded him the Deborah L.
Rhode Award for his leadership in legal education and public service. At Fordham Law
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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
DEAN DILLER: Hello everyone. My name is Matthew Diller, the
dean of Fordham Law School. Thank you so much for joining us today.
Today, we have the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial
Law’s annual symposium. This year’s topic is who makes ESG and
understanding the stakeholders in the ESG debate.
At the outset, I want to thank Professors Caroline Gentile and
Sean Griffith for their immense contributions as faculty advisors to the
Journal. I want to thank all of our incredibly distinguished panelists and
speakers today. I will give a particular shoutout to Fordham alum Scott
Simpson, from the class of ‘82, as well as to former Chief Justice Leo
Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court. I also want to thank our students,
especially the members of the Journal of Corporate & Financial Law,
and in particular Dianna Lam, the symposium editor and the architect of
this event, who will be serving as moderator.
The Journal of Corporate & Financial Law was established in
1995 and is one of the premier student-edited business law journals in
the country. It is the second-most cited specialty journal in banking and
finance and among the top ten specialty journals in corporations and
associations. Its articles, notes, essays, comments, and symposia are
heavily relied on by academics, practitioners, executives, regulators, and
judges to keep abreast of leading corporate law scholarship and
emerging issues in banking, bankruptcy, corporate governance, capital
markets, finance, mergers and acquisitions, securities, and tax law and
practice.
Today’s program is on a fascinating and important subject, and I’ll
talk about that in a moment. But first, let me just say that the Journal is
really a centerpiece of Fordham Law School’s involvement and
engagement with business law. It has been a tremendous vehicle by
which our students interact with scholars and practitioners, and both
contribute to the scholarly debate and also help to focus it through
publishing and editing. Fordham Law School has long placed a priority
on tackling difficult issues in business law. I think we are one of the few
major law schools that I know of where corporate law is a required
course. I know this makes me sound really old, but when I started on the
faculty, it wasn’t just a required course—it was a full-year required
course.
We have about 100 business law courses in the curriculum, and we
draw on both a superb faculty in the field as well as an adjunct faculty
drawn from many leading practitioners in the city and beyond. And so
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today’s program is something I’m very proud of and the school is very
proud of.
The topic is of critical importance. In recent years, the role of the
stakeholder in modern capitalism has been at the forefront of corporate
discussion. How should corporations balance the interest of stakeholders
and shareholders, particularly as they diverge? The pandemic and the
social issues which have been brought into focus this year have
strengthened the importance of this larger conversation, and today’s
program aims to foster a meaningful dialogue concerning the history,
present state, and future of environmental, social, and economic
governance criteria as a measure of corporate performance.
Our panels and speakers will address whether a corporation will
recalibrate how they deliver upon these ESG goals, or if the burden will
continue to fall on stakeholders to effectuate their desired changes. As
the pandemic and the social issues recently brought into focus have
galvanized a movement towards ESG, will that energy last, or will
businesses return to their previous state once we return to normalcy?
And what lessons can our country draw from the European Union?
Thank you for joining us today. I want to thank all of our speakers
and participants, and I want to introduce Dianna Lam, the symposium
editor in charge of this year’s program.

PANEL ONE
AJ HARRIS: Thank you for joining us today. To start this
discussion, perhaps we could take a brief overview of directors and their
duties, both in the U.S. and in Europe, to start. Are there any concerns
regarding liability for directors if they are not exclusively working to
promote shareholder value?
MR. CORTE: Let me give, perhaps, a European overview of
fiduciary duties as they relate to ESG to start the discussion; then David,
you can pick up on the U.S. bit. I think as a general matter, there is not
one standard that applies across Europe. The EU has not codified
fiduciary duties for directors; however, generally speaking, across
countries, the focus in terms of fiduciary duties of directors of European
companies is on what you refer to in Europe as the corporate interest.
What is meant by that is the interest of the company as a whole and all
of its stakeholders, so that is shareholders, of course, but that is also
employees, and to a certain degree, creditors and other stakeholders,
depending on the circumstances of the company. The general principle
applies across Europe. How that is interpreted in each jurisdiction
differs quite dramatically and depends a little bit on the legislation of
each jurisdiction.
In Europe, you go from jurisdictions where employees are required
to have a seat on the board—in certain cases, at least three seats on the
board—and therefore, have meaningful participation through their
representatives in the actual corporate governance of the company itself.
There are also situations where employees have a specific say in specific
transactions, for example, merger transactions in Europe have
consultation rights that employee representatives may exercise.1 If you
are moving jurisdictions of a company from one jurisdiction or another,
or significantly altering the business of the company, there are
requirements to consult with employees in several jurisdictions, notably
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and certain Nordic jurisdictions

† Panel 1 was moderated by symposium editor Dianna Lam and symposium committee
members AJ Harris and Taylor Wells.
1. See Council Directive 2002/14/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29–34 (EC).
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which bring their employees into the governance of the company quite
significantly.
Though you have that extreme or that reality on the one end of the
spectrum, you also have jurisdictions like, I would say, the UK, where
the approach to fiduciary duties, even though they are termed as the
interest of the company and all of its stakeholders, has traditionally
looked principally at shareholder value. The reason for that is that
employees do not really have participation in the governance of the
company and ultimately the directors are elected by shareholders and so
naturally they will tend to look at what the shareholder interests are. But
by and large, I think that there is a broader view of what the fiduciary
duties of directors are across Europe.
There is a shift these days to refocusing on the actual language that
describes these fiduciary duties and focusing on other aspects of the
company—on the input of employees and other stakeholders—and so, I
would say that given that starting point, there is far less concern with the
topic of liability of directors for not exclusively promoting shareholder
value. It would probably be the other way around, you would have to
add even in the jurisdictions that are closest to say, Delaware, you would
have to at least evaluate what the effect of decisions that you take at the
board level are on employees or other stakeholders of the company. So,
I do not think the issue is as significant in Europe as it might be in the
States, David.
MR. SILK: This is an issue that in the States, as of late, has
generated a lot of debate. Although the debate has in some respects
generated more heat than light.
Let me start with a little bit of background that is helpful because it
ties to the shift that Lorenzo was talking about. If you start way back in
the history of time, corporations had to have some kind of a public
benefit, that public benefit ran to the crown or whoever the government
was. But there had to be some public benefit element to get the
corporate charter. This faded over time, over hundreds of years until the
point in the middle of the last century, where at least in the U.S., it had
faded completely. The dominant view of corporate law was that the
purpose of the corporation was solely to benefit the financial interests of
shareholders.
As pendulums do, that pendulum has swung back over the last
several decades to the point where the Business Roundtable recognized,
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about a year ago, that corporations are really part of a larger ecosystem. 2
Part of the purpose of a corporation includes making positive
contributions to society. That background and the revised view of
purpose is important because it recognizes evolving expectations.
Expectations have changed, however, the law really has not changed. It
is critical to understand this divergence because the real-life decisions of
directors, whether here in the U.S. or elsewhere, are very much
impacted by expectations—decisions rarely flirt with the bounds of the
law. Decisions that we read about in cases are those that flirted with the
bounds of the law; those that flirt with the bounds of expectations are
dealt with by shareholder votes, and people buying and selling stock.
That is important background to what the law actually is.
Here in the United States, whether in Delaware or elsewhere, there
is in fact wide deference to the board of directors. In the limited context
of a sale or breakup of the corporation, it is clear, at least in Delaware,
that in that context the directors’ duty is to maximize the short-term
value of the Corporation for the stockholders.3 In the general operational
context, courts defer to the business judgment of disinterested directors
and do not actually require maximization of short-term stockholder
value in these ordinary course business decisions where ESG would
come into effect. Now, the limit to all that is waste: Directors are not
allowed to engage in waste.4 That being said, a board that is engaging in
an ESG-type decision is likely to consider that decision in the context of
the best interest of the company.
There is a lot of debate over this question of “must you attend
solely to the financial benefit of stockholders, or can you consider these
other things?” I think you can consider these other things, and indeed,
that is not a change in the law at all. It is important that you do consider
these other things, and I believe that the expectations have changed.
There is a greater expectation now within the United States that people
will actually pay attention to ESG type risks and opportunities in the
way that they make their decisions.
2. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote “‘An
Economy That Serves All Americans’,” BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-acorporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/3YH4N3ZB].
3. See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986).
4. See Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
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In terms of actual liability, directors of Delaware companies, at
least, have had more exposure—again in the ordinary course of
operations, rather than the terminal value situation—they have had more
exposure for failing to comply with or think about ESG considerations.
For example, the recent Bluebell case,5 where a board did not
appropriately consider the health and safety aspects of its operations and
was held to be violating its fiduciary duties. A well advised board in the
United States will think about the value aspects of the ESG
opportunities and will generally make decisions that it considers to be in
the best interests of the corporation. A component of that is going to be
the long term value of the corporation.
This is where the heat versus light comes in. You do not see a
board sitting around saying, “I am going to make this decision even
though it is going to destroy value for the corporation.” That record just
does not exist. You see directors sitting around saying, “Is this the right
thing to do and what is the benefit in making the decision?”
Bottom line is, I do not think that a well-advised board is going to
have to stay up at night worrying that they are going to have financial
exposure or liability as a result of making ESG type decisions that are
part of their ordinary-course business decisions.
MR. SIMPSON: David, if I may ask a question regarding what you
and Lorenzo said: For those of us who have been practicing in Europe
for the last 20 or 30 years, I think we would suggest that in the context
of ESG, there is a distinct advantage to a board in Europe based on the
historical reference point for European Directors, stemming from the
definition around an affirmative obligation to consider the interest of all
stakeholders and not just shareholders. Number one, I think that is an
important distinction, and perhaps gives European companies a little bit
of a head start. I accept, as you say, that for all sorts of good reasons,
including big investors in the U.S. pushing boards to consider any
variety of other interests in addition to short term interest—I get that. Do
you think that directors would benefit in the US, from a broader
definition of the corporate interest? Is it really an advantage that the
European companies have, by reference, to their home jurisdictions or
not?
MR. SILK: I think that the advantage is in the fact that these
decisions, these types of interests, are regularly brought before European
directors in a way that they might not have been regularly brought
5. Wenske v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc., 2018 WL 3337531 (Del. Ch. July 6,
2018), reargument denied, 2018 WL 5994971 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2018).
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before U.S. directors. There are states, however, that have constituency
statutes where these types of interests are specifically permitted,
although rarely required, to be considered.6 And whether or not there is
a constituency statute, I think that at the end of the day, directors think
about ESG decisions in terms of what is in the best interests of the
corporation itself, including in the context of long-term value. I think
that most ESG decisions are evaluated in the context of what value the
decision brings to the corporation. So, to get to your question, I think
that there is an advantage for European companies in that there may be
an educational head start that is historical.
MR. CORTE: How about the idea of employee participation on the
board? That is not implemented throughout Europe in a uniform manner
at all. In fact, I would still say it is probably the exception, if I think
about it. There are maybe four or five prominent jurisdictions that
prominently enforce that and some other jurisdictions, that on the wave
of ESG, are now considering whether to implement that type of
legislation and consider it from time to time. One of those is the UK
actually, where this is brought up every once in a while. Do you think
that would meaningfully influence the ability to consider ESG issues by
a board? I will tell you my perception is that in a lot of European boards
where I have seen employee representative participation, the employee
representatives were not as vocal as I would have expected them to be.
MS. BETTS: Yes, I am surprised. We were talking about ESG as a
big sort of lump thing. We have been talking a lot about social and
obviously employee’s representations, looking after your employees,
which is something that obviously has come to the fore and in the
context of COVID. If we step back a little bit from COVID and look at
ESG as what it is—Environment, Social, and Governance—I think the
United States is not as far back from Europe as everybody might think.
If you look at governance, per se, and you look at the exchange
requirements in particular, I think you have already got a really good set
of rules and ensuring that the sort of basic governance principles are
covered. You will have things, say on pay, you will have things like
board representation for minorities or an effort on gender fluidity, etc.
You do have a lot of good foundational blocks, if you want, in terms of
the “G.”
6. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate and Securities Law Impact on Social
Responsibility and Corporate Purpose, 62 B.C. L. REV. 851, 865–67 (2021).
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In terms of the “E,” there are going to be a lot of ways for the “E”
to start. Things will come to the corporation where they will not be able
to avoid it and they will have to make decisions. The boards will have to
make decisions that take into consideration, whether it is “E,” “S,” or
“G,” but generally on the “E” side, which will be linked to that
economic interest in the short, medium, and long term. In particular, if
you are going to go and try to fund a project that is deemed to be at risk
from some of the insurance—suddenly, the cost of funding those
projects is going to be higher. The valuation assigned to this project by
the stock market is going to be lower. The cost of insuring them is going
to be higher. Suddenly, you have got a cluster of incentives that are
pushing the Corporation and the board of directors to take a slightly
different approach to those, and I think in that sense, we will have a
different shape of approach to “E,” “S,” and “G.”
As to capitalism, we are all working really hard behind the scenes,
trying to bring that regulation together globally on ESG, but I think the
“E” will come through different routes to different companies. I think
the “S” is obviously very specific, very topical right now and I think the
governance is often regulated by local jurisdiction, in particular
exchange regulations, which makes for a very interesting sort of
patchwork if you want.
We need to look at all of these interests for one particular company
in one particular region. The challenge of ESG is that we are trying to
approach it as one big thing, one big silver bullet. But in fact, it has got
many facets and many ways to implement it from a board perspective.
Hopefully, directors will not feel that it is a big threat to them, but, on
the contrary, that it is full of opportunities for them trying to enhance
shareholder value.
MR. SIMPSON: Stephanie, I fully agree that it is a multi-headed
sort of issue. The one common feature about ESG is that it is different
maybe than short-term shareholder value. Before you say anything else,
I should probably highlight something on behalf of all of us, which is
that these are our own personal views, and not views of our firms or any
of our clients. So, we “take that as read,” because I am perhaps going to
say things that some of Lorenzo and my partners would disagree with. I
think the one common element to ESG in this debate is the fact that it is
different than short-term shareholder value or arguably different. I think
maybe a combination of the fact that European companies under most of
the jurisdictions where they are incorporated are encouraged to look to a
broader set of stakeholder interests which is a huge advantage to them.
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I would make the other observation and I am sure Leo Strine may
disagree later, but he gets the last statement at the end, so he can say
what he wants. I think there is another big difference here that we
haven’t touched on. In the United States, directors are regularly brought
before a court to have their conduct challenged. That is just not the case
in Europe. If you have a board in Europe that actually wants to make a
bold move: One, they can point to a definition of their duty which is
broader and allows for stakeholder interest. Two, chances are high they
are not going to get brought in front of a court anytime soon. I think that
is a very powerful tool that a European board who wants to push into
ESG has that a board in the United States might not have because they
might not be able to point to a statute that is broad enough. They
certainly will have to deal with shareholder litigation, but I don’t know,
David, if that is fair enough.
MR. SILK: As a practical matter, if the board, by pushing into a
broad new ESG development, were actually saying to itself, this is
something that we want to do for the environment, but we see no benefit
to the company, that would be hard for a board to do. But in approving a
project, a board would more likely conclude that the project is actually
good for the company because it recognizes the need for transitioning to
a lower carbon environment and moving to the next level.
Similarly, a board may recognize that social justice is important to
the functioning of its business. For example, if the company is going to
have its stores open and sell goods, there cannot be riots in the streets.
For most ESG actions that boards want to take, there is very little real
life risk that the liability framework in the United States is going to
somehow interfere with it. If you get to this question of a board wanting
to take a broad new step, maybe you just have a different viewpoint
from a U.S. company to an EU company. However, I suspect that the
board will be able to develop the kind of record that it needs, that the
action that it wants to take is in the best interests of the corporation over
the long term.
You asked whether employee representation on U.S. boards would
make a difference? I think it would, to the extent that, presumably, that
kind of representation is union-based representation. The unions here
have been very active in corporate governance, in bringing shareholder
proposals and whatnot. I don’t think they would necessarily be
wallflowers in a boardroom. I think that they probably would be active,
and I think that would bring a different perspective from at least from
the “S” part of ESG, or as Leo would say, the other “E” part of EESG.
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MS. BETTS: It is an interesting point, David, because when we talk
about diversity, and the diversity of boards, one of the things that is
interesting is not to have everybody coming from the same place,
whether it is NYU, Columbia, Harvard, or Fordham. You want people
from different horizons because you look at the company and you think,
well, I am operating in this environment. Who am I selling to? Who am
I servicing? You need some form of representation of what the real
world is within your board, so they have a better understanding of how
to position the company going forward to benefit from all the
opportunities that they are going to have. Regarding the ESG concept
versus liability, I do take on board the point that the SEC is very long
arm when it comes to punishing noncompliance, in the sort of executive.
I understand this is going to be very useful later on in our discussion, but
I think there is a very interesting point where you said, well actually, it
is almost like risk management, and ultimately, you have to be able to
show that you are doing this in furtherance of the economic interest of
the shareholders and not everything that is short term.
Unfortunately, we have the issue that companies have to report
quarterly [earnings] and sometimes that is quite hard to launch bigger
programs for a year, two year, four years that might be costly and yield
the benefits later on. I think in that sense, but I can see how boards can
position that and say, “We are not a charity. We are not doing this just
for charitable endeavors, but we think that ultimately it will benefit our
company to have more diversity to put in place—for example, offering
childcare because we want more women on board. We want a different
outlook on things.” I am taking this as an example, but any of those
things are quite valid, as are environmental issues. It is just if you learn
to look at your externalities now, understand them, and try to adjust your
business model, it might save you an enormous amount of taxes going
down the line or actually lost sales because the one thing that we will
eventually talk about on this panel is actually the power of the consumer
because when the regulation, the regulator, the legislators are not quite
there. I think that the consumer is moving quite quickly and that will
also make companies think about the reputational risk. Also, the market
rates, in terms of lost sales when products are deemed to be sort of very
much against the current flow.
MR. SILK: It is value and values.
MS. BETTS: Exactly, exactly.
MR. CORTE: Perhaps one area David raised where there is a
marked difference between Europe and the United States, in terms of the
fiduciary duties and the liabilities of directors, is in a transactional
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context. In Europe—and this is true of every jurisdiction that I have
worked with in Europe, most EU jurisdictions I would say—fiduciary
duties of directors do not evolve and do not flip to a short-term
maximization of shareholder value. For example, in a sale context, they
remain stable, and they continue to look at the interest of the corporation
and all of its stakeholders, including in a sale context. In the United
States, there is a Revlon duty that kicks in at some point and that
probably is a significant difference that allows directors less latitude. 7 I
would suggest that that allows directors in Europe to look at other
stakeholders in the company in those transactional contexts in a way that
U.S. directors cannot.
MR. SILK: That is correct. A director of a Delaware company
could not take a lower price to sell the company to someone who is
promising to operate the company in a way that protects the
environment. That is clearly a difference.
MR. SIMPSON: Can I just try something else on you guys because
it cuts against everything that I was saying a little bit earlier? Just to get
your reaction. So, on the one hand, I think the European director has an
advantage because there is a reference point to stakeholders. In addition,
I think they are insulated a little bit more from criticism because there is
not the same ability to litigate so they could be bolder if they wanted to.
Let me take the exact opposite argument and say since big investors like
BlackRock and others have become so clear when it comes to the
importance of ESG, they are pushing that agenda into the U.S.
boardroom. I would argue, and Lorenzo, if you agree, but I would argue
they are not able to as much because European corporations and boards
are a little bit more protected. So, a little bit more insulated from that
kind of immediate pressure to pay attention to what the biggest
shareholders are telling them. Is that fair, or . . .
MR. CORTE: I think they are more insulated from litigation, but
they are not more insulated from shareholder votes and for getting
thrown out of the board. If the BlackRocks or the Vanguards or many
other of these enormous asset managers decide that they are going to
focus on ESG, I think their directors will have to respond to that, if they
want, to continue to be directors of corporations. That is the reality of
things, I think.

7.

See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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MS. BETTS: Lorenzo, sorry for interrupting, but it is a really good
point. Everything hinges on voting because we can say a lot of things.
All investors can say we are going to change the way we look at what
directors are doing, but unless they actually vote against those directors
then nothing really changes. So, I think we need to start looking at what
is happening in the next proxy season and see that all these big investors
and all the signatories to the Business Roundtable are actually really
doing it in the trenches.
MR. SILK: You are right, and we will see, as the next proxy season
comes along, how meaningful their engagement has been. Engagement
is not necessarily reflected only in votes; it can also be reflected in
discussions and other pressure. But it is expectations, not necessarily the
limits of the law, that drive decisions of directors on ordinary course
operations on ESG decisions here in the United States, I think.
MS. BETTS: I think engagement is going to be really big. I think
people like the New York State Comptroller or people like the
California State Comptroller. All these people have an enormous voice
that they can contribute to the dialogue with not just their vote, but with
their engagement; telling corporations what they are expecting to see,
and as you say, you do not really see it get resolved before voting. It is
just like we need to be very mindful that in terms of execution, when
you look at the vote, there has been historically an awful lot of inertia
and directors tend to get an endorsement of 90-92%.8 How do you
challenge the way you do business when you get between 94 and 97%
positive vote every year? We need to start seeing a little bit of action
there.
MR. SILK: I would differ a little bit there. I do think that U.S.
directors are very responsive to not just votes against their reelection,
but also to votes in favor of shareholder proposals and other pressure
from the major shareholders. U.S. companies will be quite responsive to
the desires of investors like BlackRock and State Street, even if they are
not actually exercising their vote against those directors, but they are
threatening to do so.
8. See Theo Francis, Corporate Board Elections Getting a Little Less Cozy, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporate-board-elections-getting-alittle-less-cozy-11570532400 [https://perma.cc/9WBN-JMQL] (citing 2020 Proxy
Season Review, PROXYPULSE (2020), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/
broadridge-proxypulse-2020-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP66-YLCU]); Regulation
2019/2088, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on
Sustainability-Related Disclosures in the Financial Services Sector, 2019 O.J. (L 317)
1–16 [hereinafter Regulation EU 2019/2088].
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MS. BETTS: On a personal basis, I am trained initially as a U.S.
lawyer, so I understand the context beyond just the pure SEC “sticks.”
This is very much a more open market, in a way, and I think that in
terms of ESG, we will see some really good progress there because I
think, once things get going, boards and directors will be a lot more
responsive a lot quicker. That is just my expectation. It is probably a bit
counterintuitive, but I really think we are going to see some fast
progress in the next 18 to 24 months.
MR. SILK: I would agree with that.
AJ HARRIS: How do you think the regimes in the EU differ from
the United States in terms of the regulatory approach to ESG? Why do
you think United States regulators have been relatively hesitant to adopt
the sweeping changes we are seeing in the EU and to what extent do you
think the private sector led initiatives will effectively supplant the lack
of regulatory intervention?
MR. CORTE: Perhaps I should start by giving a picture of what
Europe has been doing in terms of regulation. Then David can compare
and contrast where the United States is moving at a very high level,
because I do not want everybody to fall asleep. In terms of regulation,
the EU has pursued a program that is aimed at creating some uniform
standards around ESG disclosure that is critical, because investors are
demanding that companies and directors respond to a demand to address
ESG issues.9 All of the issues—environmental sustainability, social and
governance factors—companies are scrambling to show that they are
complying and they are responding to this request. The reality is that,
already this year, we have seen massive capital reallocation as a result of
the renewed focus on ESG, and so, there is a direct financial interest in
showing that you have addressed the ESG issues.10 The risk has been, at
least in Europe, but I think in the States as well, that some companies
may be advertising ESG compliance or aspects of ESG compliance
without really having meaningfully done much, or done as much as they
are advertising they have done.

9. Anna Maleva-Otto & Joshua Wright, New ESG Disclosure Obligations, HARV.
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/
03/24/new-esg-disclosure-obligations [https://perma.cc/9UUX-ZD97].
10. See JON HALE, MORNINGSTAR, SUSTAINABLE FUNDS U.S. LANDSCAPE REPORT
12–13 (2020).
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So, the objective of these regulations in Europe is to standardize the
disclosure a little bit.11 It is also very difficult to understand and
compare and contrast the various statements made by various different
companies, or the various initiatives advertised by companies. So, the
objective is to provide some uniform standard of disclosure, to increase
comparability of companies or ESG compliance, to put some order, and
allow investors to better pick where they are going to allocate their
capital, to the extent that some of that decision is based on ESG
compliance. So, you have seen regulations, such as the taxonomy
regulation in Europe, the sustainability related disclosure regulation,
some of which require technical details to be implemented through the
regulation. However, these regulations coming into force will begin to
give some shape to the disclosure around ESG and I think that is at a
European level.
I also want to add, to give a full picture in Europe that you have got
actions taken by countries at a jurisdictional level independently of the
EU.12 Some countries have implemented some very interesting sort of
legislation that you can agree or disagree with, but it is interesting,
nonetheless.
To go back to the background that David gave at the beginning of
this webinar. France has passed the law that allows companies to
establish a mission, a purpose, a corporate purpose that is different, 13 or
additional to, that of creating long term value for shareholders. Which is
quite interesting and kind of brings it back a couple hundred years, in
that sense as David was suggesting.14 For example, Danone recently
enshrined in its organizational documents, its “health through food
mission”, in response to this change in legislation which means that
going forward, its purpose will be to generate profit for shareholders and
look after all of it stakeholders.15 But to Stephanie’s points about

11.
12.

See Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, supra note 8.
See, e.g., European Commission Press Release IP/21/224, Rule of Law:
Commission Adopts Next Step in the Infringement Procedure to Protect Judicial
Independence of Polish Judges (Jan. 27, 2021).
13. See Blanche Segrestin, Armand Hatchuel & Kevin Levillain, When the Law
Distinguishes Between the Enterprise and the Corporation: The Case of the New
French Law on Corporate Purpose, J. BUS. ETHICS (2020), https://doi.org/
10.1007/s10551-020-04439-y [https://perma.cc/NP5P-Z4DZ].
14. Code civil [C. civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1833 (Fr.).
15. See Danone To Pioneer French “Entreprise à Mission” Model To Progress
Stakeholder Value Creation, DANONE (May 20, 2020), https://www.globenewswire
.com/news-release/2020/05/20/2036111/0/en/Danone-to-pioneer-French-Entreprise-
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consumers, this also benefits its consumers’ health through the food
products that it sells and beyond that as well. So that is an interesting
sort of jurisdictional development in France.
Just to complete the picture, and then I promise I will give the
speaking stick back to others: The UK is obviously in a bit of an
awkward situation because of Brexit, which has taken a very long time
to be implemented. We are still in the transitional phase. Now we are
going to come out of the transitional phase at the end of December.
Even if you took the perspective that a lot of what the European Union
has done in terms of regulation is good, it is a bit awkward to just absorb
all of that European regulation and national law in this very moment,
when the UK is transitioning out of the EU. So, I do not think there is
disagreement in the UK as to whether, for example, the taxonomy
regulation or the sustainability related disclosure regulation or the
amendments that are non-financial reporting directive are good. I also
think the UK will come out of the EU, this transitional period will end,
and then the UK will implement a lot of its rules on its own terms. Then
in Europe, I think you will see in other countries as well, there have
been stock exchanges that have taken matters in their own hands like the
LSE which has come up with this green economy mark.16 This is kind of
interesting where based on certain data driven analysis, they determine
whether a company generates at least 50% of its revenues from green
products or services and if it does, it is awarded this green economy
mark which may attract some capital from investors that are just ESGfocused. So that is kind of a bit of a picture on what is going on in
Europe, David.
MR. SILK: In the United States there are a number of different
regulatory impacts, although many are taking a different direction from
those in Europe. From the federal government, we are not seeing any
particular movement in the direction that Europe is moving in. The
federal government itself is not moving towards and, in some ways, is
moving away from the sort of regulation that would promote ESG.
There is no federal press for uniform disclosure. An investor advisory
committee of the SEC recently issued a report requesting that SEC to

%C3%A0-Mission-model-to-progress-stakeholder-value-creation.html
[https://perma.cc/XU48-5YEW].
16. Green Economy Mark, LONDON STOCK EXCH. GRP. (Oct. 2020),
https://docs.londonstockexchange.com/sites/default/files/documents/lseg_green_econo
my_mark_factsheet_issuer_oct_2020_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/SN5P-SM8E].

2021]

WHO MAKES ESG?

297

develop sustainability metrics, which reflects the real investor hunger
for, as you say, uniform consistent ESG disclosure, but the SEC under
the current administration is unlikely to take that up. Similarly, the
CFTC has a subcommittee that has recently issued a report with literally
scores of specific recommendations mostly directed at climate change. 17
The Department of Labor (“DOL”) has proposed rules that would make
it more difficult for trustees of retirement funds to invest in ESG funds
and would prohibit those trustees from adopting an ESG fund as the
default in a menu plan.18 Under these rules, if a participant did not
choose anything else, the plan that the participant would automatically
be allocated into could not be one with an ESG mandate. So, in that
respect, DOL seems to be rowing against what feels like the main course
of the tide.
On the other hand, there are some states that are proposing and
passing legislation that is ESG-based. New York State, for example, has
adopted some legislation that will require New York State and its
entities using power in New York State to use solely renewable power
within the next 10 years, with the plan to be in place within the next four
to five years.19
There are various cross currents from Europe to the United States.
One thing that is clearly consistent between the United States and
Europe is the hunger of investors for consistent and comparable ESG
metrics. Investors really want to be able to compare across industries
and across companies within the industries on a basis that does not allow
17. New Unit Signals CFTC Targeting ESG Issues and Financial System’s Climate
Risks, JONES DAY (March 22, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-unitsignals-cftc-targeting-esg-6656297 [https://perma.cc/7UX9-GL2H]; Zachary S. Brez et
al., CFTC Panel Calls for Sweeping Climate Change Risk Regulation, BLOOMBERG
LAW (Sep. 28, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/cftcpanel-calls-for-sweeping-climate-change-risk-regulation
[https://perma.cc/F8VKTZJE].
18. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846 (Nov. 13,
2020). But see Press Release, U.S. Department of Labor Releases Statement on
Enforcement of its Final Rules on ESG Investments, Proxy Voting By Employee
Benefit Plans (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/
ebsa20210310 [https://perma.cc/7WGZ-PLVN].
19. Press Release, Governor Cuomo Announces New Competitive Program to
Retain New York’s Existing Renewable Energy Resources (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-new-competitiveprogram-retain-new-yorks-existing-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/XUL5-AMY6].
The plan, dubbed “Competitive Tier 2,” aims to procure 70% of electricity consumed in
the state from renewable energy sources by 2030. Id.
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for greenwashing. The other area where there is some similarity is that
Delaware, for example, has also adopted a statute that allows a company
to form a different type of corporation, a benefit corporation, that has a
purpose that is not simply the pursuit of profits, but has some other
social or environmental purpose.20 We have not seen a lot of those
companies hit the stock exchange, but there are some, and so that theme
exists in the United States as well.
MS. BETTS: Well, I agree. If you look at California as well, it is
incredible how their definition of renewables is so much stricter than
what we have, even in Europe. So, some companies which we deem as
renewable in Europe, for let us say, green label, will actually be deemed
by the State of California to not be renewable because the energy comes
from different states—it is green energy, but from a different state.
I think my view, with the United States, is there is actually an awful
lot happening under the bonnet in terms of ESG. Nobody really wants to
necessarily put their head way above the path that we are somewhere, I
think Leo will say, as we know, but the reality is there is an awful lot
happening. When the gates open, I think we will see that the U.S. is
probably quite a ways ahead and will suddenly bring some gravitas, and
some weight to this debate.
When you look at market caps, very simply, and the importance of
the U.S. exchanges, the SEC has been very clear. Even Jay Clayton, as
we know, who has been appointed by the President.21 It has been very
difficult for him to be very vocal on this, but he has made it clear that if
companies report on ESG, the SEC will review it, and review the quality
of the information. So, the key thing is to get those companies to report
and there might be other ways to do that.
We talked about the exchanges, and I think the exchanges are in a
fantastic position to actually declare that companies have to have a
stable transition. You talk about to stay on pay. What about the sound
transitions? That is not unthinkable, and if anything, I think that is
probable.

20.
21.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–365 (West 2021).
Jay Clayton served as SEC Chairman from May 4, 2017 to December 23, 2020.
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Biography: Jay Clayton, https://www.sec.gov/biography/
jay-clayton [https://perma.cc/9SBV-NP4U] (last visited Aug. 20, 2021); Press Release,
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Statement of SEC Chairman Jay Clayton Regarding the
Conclusion of His Tenure (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/clayton-2020-12-23 [https://perma.cc/GVK3-CR9D].
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MR. SILK: I agree that in the absence of government regulation,
there will be organizations that will step in and in fact we do see that in
the United States. We do not have the same sort of government driven
standardization, but we do have NGO-driven standardization and the
investors are pushing the companies to it.22 And if that is not successful
then exchanges may as well.
MS. BETTS: Another truth is we do not need to all do the same
thing in the same way. We like different things in different countries.
We like our tea differently. I am French and I still cannot make English
tea the way they like it, like Britain. I think the interesting thing about
ESG—and I was talking about this with people from the accounting and
an audit world—is that what matters is that the TCFD framework works
for everybody.23 TCFD and SASB,24 we are going to get to a point
where we are going to have a set of building blocks that everybody can
take home and I think the interesting thing is, each country and each
zone, will have its own jurisdictional setup, and therefore, we need to
leave the implementation probably down to regional or country
specificities. The overriding sense of drive has to be common.
I know we are talking about ESG, the three facets of it, but if we
actually brought you into one of the questions, we have here, in terms of
the architecture of priorities. It is quite obvious now that climate has to
take the lead because unless we sort out climate, we will not be having
these conversations in five years’ time. This is a conversation we had
with Mark Carney; forget 2050, it looks nice on paper, but in reality, this
is a very different world we are talking about. We have to look at 2030
at the very latest, because if you look at what the scientists are telling
you, between negative feedback loops and the vast unknowns, we
cannot really bank on 2050.
I think for me, looking at it from the regulatory side of things and
the practical implementation side of things, I think, let us stand back for
a minute. What is the spirit of the law? What are we trying to achieve
here? What are we trying to do? We are trying to get some form of
22. Frameworks devised by NGOs include Bloomberg, CDP, CDSB and others.
See Seon Barbera, Edward Greene & Hannah Orowitz, The ABCs of ESG: Initiatives
and
Organizations
Issuers
Should
Understand,
GEORGESON
(2019),
https://www.georgeson.com/us/ABCs-of-ESG-Initiatives-and-Organizations-for-Issuers
[https://perma.cc/MC4P-SFC9].
23. TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsbtcfd.org [https://perma.cc/E7CS-9EDW] (last visited Aug. 20. 2021).
24. SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.sasb.org [https://
perma.cc/FAN7-CR5K] (last visited Aug. 20. 2021).

300

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVI

global movement, global compliance where companies are starting to
take into account the impact of the externalities for 200 plus years, we
have been growing, developing, buying cars and air conditioning and
bikes in certain colors. It has been fun and nobody cared, but suddenly,
it really matters. It is actually vital that we get this sorted and so if you
look at this, and I would encourage anybody who is listening to these to
look up someone called Jem Bendell and read that piece called Deep
Adaptation.25 It is a very extreme view, but it is a view that has to be
known, because it is just the collation of all the sort of scientific views
on climate and it really clearly tells you. Well, unless you do something
yesterday, it is going to be very challenging.
Now hopefully we are resourceful, and there will be a lot of money
put into climate tech, into people repurposing their business model.
There is going to be a lot going on, but I think we need to not lose sight
of the end goal, which is that we absolutely have to drastically reduce
the level of emissions globally, whatever it takes in whichever
jurisdiction. I know there will be lots of debate between developing and
developed countries. Why is it fair that we had all this time to emit and
consume as we wished, and now they can’t do the same? It is tough. We
will have to have those difficult discussions, and we will have to have
the discussion as to the cost of it and the ultimate cost of not doing it.
So, there’s going to be some interesting discussion in the next 18
months or so, but I think countries and jurisdictions should have some
leeway as to what works best for them.
So, what works best for the United States, what works best in the
UK, we will never have uniformity of jurisdiction. In itself, that is not an
issue, but what matters is that we are aligned on the overarching goal to
get there. That is really what matters right now. And that is why, for us
it is looking at, technically, how do we implement that? How do we
make it work? And I am really convinced that at some point, once the
United States gets on board officially, things will roll up much quicker
than we expect.
MR. SIMPSON: So, this may be an unfair observation, but I think
that we have seen in Europe, a willingness of the governments to
intervene, as Lorenzo outlined. I am not necessarily a pro regulation sort
of person, but in this area, I think there is an advantage currently in
25. See Jem Bendell, Deep Adaptation: A Map for Navigating Climate Tragedy,
IFLAS Occasional Paper 2, (revised July 27, 2020), http://www.lifeworth.com/
deepadaptation.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6JB-VAF5].
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Europe, where the governments are prepared to intervene. I think there
is a reluctance in the United States to do so. One question is whether the
investment community is actually going to drive sufficient fundamental
change even in the absence of government regulation.
MR. SILK: That is a fair and open question. Clearly, we are not
going to have the kind of federal regulation, limiting emissions or even
driving the limitation of emissions through disclosure that you see in
Europe under the Trump administration.26 Maybe in a Biden
administration, we could see some of that. What we have seen during
the Trump administration, particularly during the last two years, is
significant pressure bought by the major institutional investors.27
Whether that will be sufficient to drive the kind of behavior changes that
you are seeing in Europe is still an open question.
MS. BETTS: I think between that and the consumer, between the
big investors, the stock exchange, and the consumer, you are going to
have a lot of pushing there. In France, you have Emmanuel Macron
calling people.28 He would call the CEOs and just said on Monday, I
want you to announce this, and I would like you to do this. So, he was
very driven, he is very much obviously behind all these efforts in your
office. He has been very proactive and literally picked up the phone
because it is France, because we have got the code Napoleon. We
operate differently in France, so again, I think the implementation would
be very different from country to country due to cultural differences.
MR. SILK: Our implementation was not all that different right? We
had our president tweeting, instead of calling someone on the phone. It
is just that he was taking the opposite end of the spectrum.
MS. BETTS: I know, fair enough.
26. See, e.g., Lisa Woll & Judy Mares, Opinion, The Trump administration wants
to discourage your 401(k) from including ESG investments options, MARKETWATCH
(Sep. 8, 2020, 5:11 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-trumpadministration-wants-to-discourage-your-401k-from-including-esg-investment-options2020-09-07 [https://perma.cc/ZD7J-AX6Q].
27. See Sara Bernow, Bryce Klempner & Clarisse Magnin, From ‘Why’ to ‘Why
Not’: Sustainable Investing as the New Normal, MCKINSEY & CO. (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal-investors/ourinsights/from-why-to-why-not-sustainable-investing-as-the-new-normal
[https://perma.cc/8A6P-4WAJ].
28. President Emmanuel Macron Met with 33 CEOs From Among the World’s
Largest Institutional Investors to Discuss Climate Action, NET ZERO ENERGY (Nov. 26,
2020), https://netzeroenergy.gr/2020/11/26/president-emmanuel-macron-met-with-33ceos-from-among-the-worlds-largest-institutional-investors-to-discuss-climate-action
[https://perma.cc/L95L-KGKN].
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MR. CORTE: One observation on disclosure regulation and
regulation of these types of issues. What I’ve observed in the 20 years
I’ve worked in this area is that disclosure regulation and the like
between Europe and the United States has converged quite significantly
over the years. Regulators talk to one another because ultimately the
investor market, the BlackRocks, State Streets, Vanguards of this world,
invest in the United States and they invest in Europe. They are the same
people really and have the same policies. Ultimately, I think there will
be a process of convergence between these regulations and disclosure. I
do think it will take a little bit of time. I think we are at the very
beginning, even in Europe in terms of regulating this area, right? The
rules are coming into effect in 2021 and some of them require heaps of
technical regulation to sort of make them really implementable and
somewhat intelligible, so I think there will be a process of convergence,
but I think it is going to take a while.
MR. SIMPSON: I fully agree, and I do not want to say anything too
controversial or too negative, but look how long it took to separate the
chairman role from the CEO role, assuming you think that is a good
thing. It is a different issue than ESG, but look how long it took U.S.
companies to align with the separation of those two positions when left
to the market changing. It took a decade or more, David.29 I think for
that trend to really take hold and so just if that is an example in the
absence of some kind of regulatory intervention, I just fear that it is
going to take a long time for investors and consumers to drive the kind
of change that I think the science is telling us needs to be made kind of
yesterday.
MS. BETTS: I agree with you, but we actually do not have that
time. I think we need to think of what is happening now, like in the
olden days, you would have no seat belt. My father used to drive the car
with cigar out of the window and four kids with no seatbelts happy go
lucky in the middle of the night. It was brilliant. We look back thinking,
“We all made it, right?” So, this is unthinkable now, but I think in a few
years, it will be the same with ESG and disclosure and so on. The
separation of the CEO and having a lead independent director or the

29. Charles A. Tribbett, III, Splitting The CEO And Chairman Roles—Yes or No?,
RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOC’S (Dec. 1, 2012), https://www.russellreynolds.com/
newsroom/splitting-the-ceo-and-chairman-roles-yes-or-no
[https://perma.cc/ED7HBB9D].
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Chairman, these are stuck in time for a lot of reasons, cultural reasons,
etc.
Also, we did not have the burning urgency. Now if I may say, when
you look at what is happening in California, California is obviously
burning and certain parts of Florida are getting a bit under water, as far
as I can gather. You have things that are happening at a pace that we
cannot cope with. When you look at what the insurers are seeing and
what they say in their reports in terms of the accelerations of the
incidents link to climatic, sort of the range of events. If you want, is
much higher in terms, more fires of the highest severity. Same thing
with the floods, it is getting harder to insure the world. Now, none of us
want to live in a non-insurable world.
At some point the regulator is going to say it is taking a long time.
How much time do we really have? Do we want to continue to play nice
and maybe incentivize CEOs and executive in companies by telling
them, “If you do good things on climate, we will tie this up to your
executive compensation to the tune of, let us say, 5%?” That is a bit of a
joke. So again, this is for me, a form of greenwashing, you say. When
you look at companies and say how much of your executive
compensation is linked to climate targets, this is obviously the next thing
that is going to happen. We need to think in terms of set of incentives,
we need to think of “where are we now?” We are all working in the
spirit of a financial system that is fragilized by the climatic events. The
system is fragile because we are trading on eggshells. A lot of the
intrinsic value of these companies is challenged by climatic events, but
currently they are completely insulated, and I think that is the danger.
MR. SILK: To me the question is, how are we actually going to get
from the place where we are to the place that you are describing? How is
that going to be? One choice is regulation, and the other choice is, as
Scott notes, investor pressure. I think Scott was questioning whether
investor pressure will actually get us there. To me, Scott, the contrary
example to separation of CEO and Chair is the elimination of the poison
pill that happened over a couple of years because that was something
that investors actually cared about. I do not think that investors cared as
much or still do care as much of, at least in the United States, about
separation of Chair and CEO, because I think investors recognize that
for different companies, you can have a different outcome.
With respect to uniform disclosure of a basic set of metrics, it is
clear that many investors want it. Institutional investors are being driven
by their own customers: The people who are investing their own dollars
are looking more frequently for an ESG impact with respect to their
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investment. As the popularity of ESG funds increases, more funds think
about ways to become “ESG funds,” and more funds need uniform ESG
disclosure. So, I think it is a different case than the case you suggested.
MS. BETTS: Nobody thought about a set of the right incentives;
really, it is how the incentives are set up to get to the right outcomes.
TAYLOR WELLS: David mentioned a few minutes ago that
President Trump tweets out policy, whereas Lorenzo mentioned that in
contrast, regulators tend to talk to each other. Now it seems that there
are real risks and costs to implementing these standards. Given this
uncertainty, what other concerns do you have regarding the rollout of
ESG standards?
MR. SILK: First of all, what will eventually be rolled out in the
United States in terms of standards is unclear. I worry about
inconsistency or failure to achieve the kind of consistency that investors
are looking for. Personally, the most important goal is getting some kind
of uniform consistent disclosure because that will allow investors to
make the decisions they want to make without relying on inconsistent
ratings agencies that can apply whatever weight they want to whatever
questions they want. So, the thing that I am worried about is
inconsistency.
MR. CORTE: Similarly, David, I think it is similarly, but what I
worry about in Europe and I always worry about this in Europe is
overregulation. In other words, Europe has a much more regulatory
environment than the United States, which is more sort of disclosure
based. My fear is that regulation is passed with certain objectives in
mind on a one-size-fits-all basis where that just does not fit the range of
companies that need to be thought of when you think about ESG and
disclosure regulation. For some companies, the “S” and the “G” will be
more important than the “E.” Take for example, a solar energy company
or wind company, you’re not going to be too concerned with the “E”
with that kind of company. So, whether you invest in that clean energy
company as opposed to another clean energy company will probably be
more about whether they are better addressing the “S” and the “G” than
the other clean energy company. Since they are both clean energy
companies, I am a little bit worried about one-size-fits-all regulation that
causes capital to shift because labels are associated with companies that
do not really reflect what efforts these companies are making and
whether they are making a real impact or not. Whether that is in the
environmental area or in social or governance, that is at least my worry
for Europe.
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MR. SIMPSON: I do not disagree. On the other hand, we have seen
in recent years that deregulation, in particular, in and around
environmental matters, is a real concern that has set back the ESG
agenda big time in the United States. If I go back to Stephanie’s point
about seatbelts, how did that get fixed? The states were refusing to adopt
the uniform system of regulation, so the federal government stepped in
and basically said, “If you want to get money for your highways, you
will have a seatbelt law,” and that is what ultimately brought it. So, I do
think that the markets will not drive change fast enough and we are
going to need more intervention on the part of governments and
regulation. Notwithstanding Lorenzo’s concern about regulation or illconceived regulation, I just do not think we can rely on a market
solution entirely.
MS. BETTS: I agree with you, Scott. We might also need to think
outside the box, we might also see things that we have not seen much
before like companies coming together and regulators coming together,
company regulators and investors coming together. I know the Bank of
England, in particular, has been very, very active in driving these sorts
of subcommittees and study groups and it has been brilliant.
One of the things that I found really interesting is looking at things
like SASB and GRE teams coming together, looking at things like the
water coalition that started recently led by Coke and Diageo, where
those big companies that are heavily reliant on water, which is the other
side of carbon, have come together to try to improve the way they
manage externalities; but really learning from each other, helping each
other rather than competing with each other because they know together
they have to increase the threshold in terms of best practice.
The other thing that seems to be interesting is that when these big
companies have to rely on suppliers, suddenly they have to clean up
their supply chain as well. So, you start to have almost like a domino
effect where if they can work in sync with a more enlightened regulator
who listens to what is happening on the ground so that the regulation is
appropriate and works. So, we try to avoid too many unintended
consequences which I know is probably on Lorenzo’s mind and is right,
there is often too many of those. But I think if we can, because of the
urgency and because of the common goal that we all share at the
moment.
Let us forget the non-believers for now, but I really think that we
are going to see some cohesion around that goal from companies,
regulators, and legislators. I think we will see some form of an
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ecosystem starting to take shape with a set of incentives that are put
together that will start to bring those new behaviors. I really think so.
Coming back to the point of disclosure quickly and the conformity
of the disclosure, I think the big thing we will have to be wary of is
obfuscation versus disclosure. Everybody has got very clever lawyers
and can actually say an awful lot but not say much and we all know that.
How do you make company disclose in a way that is relevant,
significant, easily understandable, very clear, and easily comparable to
another? I think that to some extent, when the regulation come[s], the
format of that disclosure is very important, and that is where things like
SASB, which is a brilliant tool, will be really handy.
I think there are a lot of ways to look at things in a very sort of
almost graphic way and the companies that are doing really, really well
with disclosure at the moment are giving some very good examples—
people like Visa and Microsoft. You can get a really interesting example
of a very graphic specific disclosure, where there is no room for
interpretation. For instance, a really good example of that is if you look
at diversity, companies can write two pages on diversity and how
amazing they are at recruiting lots of people from everywhere. Then
they say look at our board, how diverse our board is, how amazing. But
actually, what you really want to see are those pyramid charts, where
you see the intake. Then when you see the board, you also want to see
that they nurture the people that they have taken on board, opening
broader gates for diversity and that these people are being nurtured all
the way through the leadership ladder.
MR. SILK: That can be addressed, right? I mean, if you require
metrics, you can get metrics.
MS. BETTS: Exactly.
TAYLOR WELLS: Shifting more to the future of ESG. What
would you like to see happen in the ESG space to the next, say, five to
ten years and how realistic is that?
MR. SILK: Whether it is a voluntary industry driven disclosure
framework or a required disclosure framework, I would expect that at
least in the United States there will be substantial disclosure along some
kind of a framework, such as SASB plus TCFD or the World Economic
Forum’s new proposal or the convergence of SASB plus GRI, but I
would expect within, hopefully even sooner than five years, some kind
of regular uniform disclosure. I think that would be a very meaningful
and important development where these kinds of metrics that Stephanie
was just talking about will be available to shareholders.
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MR. SIMPSON: I mean, it is a point Lorenzo said a little bit earlier
and I agree with it. I am an optimist by nature, so I did not mean my
other comments to be too much of a downer, but I think we can also
expect David to see the kind of cooperation with a little bit of a wind at
our back, the same kind of cooperation that we saw between the SEC
and the European regulators around disclosure. We have seen
convergence in accounting standards. We have seen convergence around
prospectus disclosure. There is no reason to not expect to see this kind
of convergence around ESG disclosure and the SEC and those
regulators. Its counterparts in Europe have proven their ability to kind of
get that done on a transatlantic basis that sometimes it takes some time,
but I think there is a big enough track record. I think a change in attitude
in Washington DC for that kind of change to come quickly.
MR. SILK: Yes, I agree with that.
MR. CORTE: I think what we will see is—several companies have
done this already—companies instituting governance mechanisms to
ensure that there is real focus and accountability for ESG.
The widespread establishment, for example, of sustainability
committees in addition to an audit committee, to a nomination
committee, to a disclosure committee, a focused sustainability
committee, a focused chief sustainability officer. I think, by necessity,
standards and incentives for management that will drive management to
make decisions in favor of ESG sustainability. So, whether that is
environment, whether that is social values or governance, I think
companies need this. Until companies set themselves up with these
types of internal infrastructures that are focused on achieving certain
ESG objectives and until management is appropriately incentivized to
do so, you can have board decisions, but that is kind of where it stops
right?
MR. SILK: To that point, we are beginning to see increased ESG
elements as part of annual bonus schemes, based on quantifiable goals
and disclosures ahead of time. People actually have to meet their goals
in order to get the payout. The other thing I think we will see over time
is while we are now seeing a rush into ESG funds, many kinds of
mainstream funds are reclassifying themselves as ESG funds by
adopting an ESG mandate. I think over time, what we will see is the
elimination of the ESG funds because every fund will look at ESG as
just another way of evaluating risk and opportunity. It is another tool in
the toolkit.
MS. BETTS: I agree with you, David. Who wants to invest in an
unsustainable fund? And I agree with you that the whole ESG name will

308

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVI

be dropped because it is just a new set of risk metrics that you have to
manage.
MR. SILK: So catchy.
MS. BETTS: The other interesting thing in terms of nudge, we are
talking about incentives, you get the hardcore incentives of, for
example, an exchange regulation or a compensation link to
compensation in terms of ESG matrix. The other interesting one, which
we have seen is companies that are giving incentives to their suppliers to
do the right thing from an environmental point of view or ESG point of
view. So, you get a better pricing, or you get a sort of more long-term
contracts; you will have some interesting little developments like this,
which will make it happen on the ground.
MR. SIMPSON: I think Dianna wants to ask a final question, if I
got the cue correct. We have been going on, and Dianna, can I just say,
it has been a fantastic symposium you put together and I mean
congratulations, I am looking forward to listening to the rest.
DIANNA LAM: Thank you, you have had a very interesting
conversation. I do want to present one of the questions that have come
in. We have gotten quite a few, but we figured this one might be good to
end it.
What do you all make of recent research in the review of financial
studies which suggests that private companies in the United States have
lower emissions than publicly traded company?30
MR. SILK: I have to say, I have not seen that research and I am
very interested to see it. I would have thought that as companies become
disfavored by the public markets, such as coal and guns, that those
would fall into private hands. I suppose a countervailing factor is that
many, many private equity investors, including the pension funds that
are investing directly in private equity, are pressing ESG on the private
equity managers in much the same way that the index funds are pressing
ESG and climate change preparedness on public companies. I suppose it
is easier to pressure those privately held companies because the
shareholder base is smaller and individually more influential.
MR. SIMPSON: Thank you, I would like to see the study as well. I
mean another possible explanation is that for the time being certain
public company boards are still whipsawed between the desire of some
30. See generally Sophie A. Shive & Margaret M. Forster, Corporate Governance
and Pollution Externalities of Public and Private Firms, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 1296 (Mar.
2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz079 [https://perma.cc/G7Q2-GDZZ].
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shareholders, some important shareholders to push ESG and other
shareholders who are more focused on short termism. While they are
whipsawed, they are a little slower to act than as you say, David, a
private company that has a core investor with a clear vision. It is the
only thing I can think of and hopefully over time that whipsawing will
be eliminated, and directors of public companies will follow the
important ESG directives.
MR. CORTE: To Stephanie’s point and to the point that is being
made more generally, smaller companies do not have to report their
results quarterly, right? So, they can take a very long-term view. That
might be an explanation.
MR. SILK: But if whoever asked that question can send us the link
to the study.
MR. SIMPSON: Yes, we would all be interested.
MS. BETTS: We are all keen to see it.
DIANNA LAM: We have it and we will definitely send it to you.
MR. SILK: Great, thank you.
DIANNA LAM: So, this concludes the first panel. Thank you all so
much for coming today and providing your insight, we will break for
five minutes and then we will resume with the second panel.

PANEL TWO
DIANNA LAM: The second panel will discuss Stakeholders as the
driving force of ESG. Again, the last 10 minutes are reserved for the
audience. Please type your questions in the chat box. I will now turn it
over to the committee members who will engage in this dialogue with
our panelists Carmen Lu, Lisa Fairfax, and David Webber.
AJ HARRIS: Welcome, everyone. To get started on today’s panel,
can we talk about some of the ways to quantifiably measure and
communicate the impact of an organization’s ESG efforts on its
stakeholder satisfaction and retention?
MS. LU: AJ, I think there are many ways to measure, quantify and
communicate an organization’s ESG efforts. One of the most common
methods that is currently done is to engage in ESG reporting through
stand-alone ESG reports. There are a number of major frameworks, for
example, SASB;1 GRI, the Global Reporting Initiative;2 and TCFD,3
which focuses on climate-related impacts. These frameworks all provide
various metrics that allow companies to demonstrate how they are
performing on ESG.
Another pathway for communicating ESG efforts, and which many
companies are adopting, is providing disclosure on their website.
On a growing number of company websites, you will see information on
the company’s ESG goals, such as goals relating to employees or
relating to the treatment of suppliers and engagement with local
communities. In addition, we are also seeing active engagement between
companies and their key investors discussing critical ESG issues such as
diversity and inclusion, adaptation to climate change risks, and so forth.

† Panel 2 was moderated by symposium editor Dianna Lam and symposium committee
members AJ Harris, Nicole Mecca, Avery Golombek, Taylor Wells, and Marie
Bogenez.
1. SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.sasb.org [https://
perma.cc/F899-XQWV] (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
2. GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org [https://
perma.cc/B7QN-C5ZE] (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
3. TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsbtcfd.org [https://perma.cc/JFG7-W323] (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
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MS. FAIRFAX: I will just weigh in, Carmen. First, I want to say
thank you so much for having me here today. It has been a very
engaging conversation so far, and I am so happy to be a part of this
discourse.
As Carmen suggests, there are all kinds of ways in which
companies communicate their efforts. I think the last statistic I saw said
something like 85% or 86% of S&P 500 companies have some type of
sustainability report, and I think that statistic was from two years ago—
they do it voluntarily, often on their website and in other forums.4 I do
think that one of the interesting trends that is a positive one is the effort
to try to push that communication into the proxy statement. I think that
one of the concerns about the voluntary reporting and the reporting in
different locations is there is not as much board oversight with respect to
what is going in those documents. Maybe that could have an impact on
whether and to what extent boards prioritize the goals and the targets
that are there. So, I do think that in terms of thinking about effective
communication, one piece of it is trying to push that information into the
proxy statement, especially when it is in the proxy statement that there is
an overt recognition that investors also want to be communicated with
about that type of information. It is not just something going out to other
stakeholders.
I will also say that Carmen is right. There is so much information.
One of the concerns is that it is too much, and that we are not being
thoughtful enough about the nature of the information that is being
produced and making sure that it is useful because, at times, it is
overinclusive, and at other times, it is underinclusive. Certainly, there
have been a lot of complaints about the lack of uniformity.
We know there are all kinds of ways in which we saw this on the
first panel, what people mean by the “E,” the “S,” and the “G.” How are
they measuring it? What does it mean for their company? Sometimes
that is difficult to discern at a particular company because the lack of
uniformity makes it difficult to make comparisons across companies and
across industries. When we think about effective communication, it is
also about trying to have some type of understanding about the

4. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY INST., FLASH REPORT: 86% OF S&P 500
INDEX COMPANIES PUBLISH SUSTAINABILITY/RESPONSIBILITY REPORTS IN 2018 (May
16, 2019), https://www.ga-institute.com/press-releases/article/flash-report-86-of-sp500-indexR-companies-publish-sustainability-responsibility-reports-in-20.html
[https://perma.cc/VB34-7VF7].
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appropriate information and how we can at least find some uniformity
with regard to that information.
This is my plug for saying that while the market has been a good
source of driving information, in order to get really effective disclosure,
it is probably going to require something more, so that the disclosure
can be useful across companies and industries.
MR. WEBBER: I agree. Standardization is obviously critically
important to developments like SASB,5 and others are moving things in
that direction. But of course, it is always the classic problem of making
the apples to apples comparisons and needing to be able to do that.
The only other point I would emphasize—and I do not have much to add
to what Carmen and Lisa just said—but picking up on Carmen’s point
about the shareholder engagement piece: look at what BlackRock and
State Street have done in terms of announcing policies like gender
diversity targeting, increased gender diversity in corporate boards,
voting along those lines, engaging with corporate managers on those
subjects. Obviously, they are big voices and they wield significant
market carrots and sticks, and certain investors do indeed have
a significant role to play in driving these changes inside companies.
I think many other institutions follow along or take their cues from that.
It will be interesting to see what new issues those institutions pick up in
the coming years, and how particular issues get onto their agendas or
not, because that in and of itself has a significant role in the future
development of ESG in the marketplace.
MS. LU: On Lisa and David’s point about the lack of
standardization, it has definitely been a key source of concern for
investors and various other stakeholders. The often-asked question is:
How do you measure companies’ performances using metrics that are
not directly comparable? As a result, we have seen efforts to reach
agreed-upon disclosure metrics and standards, notably from the World
Economic Forum, whose recently released reporting framework aims to
standardize the ESG reporting process and draws from existing
frameworks, such as GRI and SASB.
It will be interesting to see what happens in the next couple of
months or so, and whether companies and investors coalesce around one
uniform framework. It will also be interesting to see how the disclosures
are used by investors, stakeholders, various third-party ratings agencies,
and proxy advisory services. How disclosures are used will in turn
5.

SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 1.

2021]

WHO MAKES ESG?

313

impact how companies choose to report their ESG performance in the
long term.
MS. FAIRFAX: This question about shareholders and how they are
engaging around ESG is really interesting, because they are helping to
fill in the bubble as to what counts as “E,” what counts as “S,” and what
counts as “G.” So there is a push around diversity, for example, that
obviously has been something that has been on many stakeholders’
radars and companies’ radars, but then you start seeing larger
shareholders pushing forward. All of a sudden, the bubble gets filled in a
little darker as we think about normalizing the notion that is part of the
ESG framework. It is very interesting to think about how those issues
get shaped.
MR. WEBBER: Absolutely, if you look at the lifecycle on
environmental issues and environmental shareholder proposals.
In the beginning, they were brought by sort of smallish, some would say
fringe, ESG investors when ESG was still considered a quixotic thing,
a tiny market niche. Then you had other institutions, some of the big
public pension funds and others started to pick up on it and that raised
the profile of it. It also raised the kind of vote totals and shareholder
proposals. We then hit 2017, and for the first time we started to see
some of the biggest players in the markets vote in favor of those
proposals; notably, proposals that they did not bring themselves, but
they did start to vote in favor of them a little bit. We have seen a little bit
more of that since and so that is one kind of interesting life cycle of how
you watch an issue like this move from the periphery into the core and
how it gets there. That is one pattern of how this stuff evolves, and
standardization has a role to play, too, but keep an eye on that particular
channel through which these issues become central.
AJ HARRIS: If I can pick up on something that David mentioned:
board diversity. Lisa, you have been writing about this for over 10 years
now. Could we get your thoughts on what you are seeing in today’s
environment, and how it relates to the work that you have done?
MS. FAIRFAX: Yes, I have written in this area. It is a kind of glass
half-empty, glass half-full situation happening. I will wear my “glass
half-full optimism hat” first. There is a lot of momentum. There is
a push by some of these major players. The big three—Vanguard, State
Street, and BlackRock—have all kind of made diversity one of the chief
considerations that they are engaging around and that they will vote
around, and that has really increased the momentum, particularly with
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regard to gender diversity. Last year, for the first time in history, every
single company in the S&P 500 had at least one woman on its board.6
Last year we have seen record numbers of new directors who are women
and more than any other group of people who are new directors.
So, there has just been this huge momentum behind diversity efforts.
But I have got to say, even with the glass half-full, I am much more
pessimistic about Blacks and people of color than I am about women.
My work over 10 years has suggested that there has not really been
much progress in that area, and even though it is the case that diverse
directors are making up some ground with larger percentages of new
directors, it is also the case that 2019 studies show that Black directors
account for only 1% of the total board seats at S&P 500 companies.7
A full 37% of those companies had no Black directors on their board at
all, and that is concerning, especially because throughout the time that
I have been writing about this, there have been professions that really
think this is important. Most studies say that social movements really
have not moved the needle that much, so I think there is cause for
concern there.
I will say two things about why I think there is real cause for
concern. One is that there continues to be this pattern where Black
directors and directors of color are “overboarded,” or at least holding
multiple board seats in ways that white directors do not. Even when you
think about the numbers in percentages, it is overcounting because they
reflect a small subset of people. I saw one CNN article about a Black
person who had held 14 board seats through his lifetime,8 and that is
reflective of the insular nature of the board search process. The vast
majority of people get on boards based on the people that they know.
Increasing Black representation poses challenges that adding white
6. Jeanne Sahadi, For the First Time, There’s a Woman on Every S&P 500 Board.
But They’re Still in the Minority, CNN BUS. (Dec. 17, 2020, 3:40 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/16/success/women-sp-500-board-directors/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5C9U-M8NK].
7. DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, DIVERSITY IN THE C-SUITE: THE DISMAL
STATE OF DIVERSITY AMONG FORTUNE 100 SENIOR EXECUTIVES, ROCK CTR. FOR CORP.
GOVERNANCE AT STAN. U. No. CGRP-82 (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587498
[https://perma.cc/QW77-Q4RL].
8. Sara Ashley O’Brien, He’s Served on 14 Boards. Now He Wants Companies to
Find Other Black Candidates, CNN BUS. (July 24, 2020, 9:35 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/24/tech/barry-lawson-williams-black-boardrepresentation/index.html [https://perma.cc/XKD4-YRLF].
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women may not.9 Most of the women elected to the boards are white
and selected because they had professional connections with the white
men who still dominate boardrooms.10
Similar networks between white corporate leaders and potential
Black directors are less well-developed. In an interview, a prominent
board member mentioned that in white America, she does not know that
everyone even knows a Black person. What does that mean for this
process that relies so heavily on social and informal networks? It means
that we are in this loop of doing the same thing over and over again and
expecting different results. Somebody told me this was insanity, but I do
not think it is.
MS. LU: Just picking up on Lisa’s comment regarding
“overboarding” of individual Black directors, one of the big issues that
companies and investors have started to realize must be tackled is the
pipeline problem. One contributing factor to having overboarded women
directors or overboarded Black directors is the absence of a large
number of Black, of color, and female candidates moving through the
ranks into senior management that prepares individuals to have the right
skill set and experiences that make them ideal director candidates.
As a result, you have certain individuals who are qualified, but find
themselves being asked to serve on multiple boards and then finding
themselves stretched thin as a result. This problem is going to continue
to compound as investors and stakeholders continue to call for greater
gender diversity and racial diversity on boards unless greater attention is
being paid to the need to develop a credible pathway for diverse
individuals to rise through the corporate ranks. I think one of the issues
that investors and other stakeholders are realizing is that it is not simply
enough to have board diversity. It is also important that there is
workforce diversity, and that diversity also occurs in middle
management and throughout the entire company. Whereas in the past,
a lot of diversity and inclusion initiatives were siloed in one particular
part of the corporate structure, people are now realizing that perhaps it is
important to combine these efforts with the HR function in order to help
create diverse boards in an organic manner over the long term.

9. Jeff Green, After Adding More Women to Boards, Companies Pivot to Race,
BLOOMBERG QUINT (Aug. 19, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/
onweb/companies-seek-more-black-directors-after-adding-women
[https://perma.cc/2B2J-3R3X].
10. Id.
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MR. WEBBER: So, if this issue is going to move from glass halfempty to glass half-full, I think that what we have to keep an eye out for
is: Can the question of racial diversity and corporate boards follow the
same path that was followed with environmental issues, and more
recently with gender diversity issues?
Some investors are raising it and pushing it into the center of the
agenda. It is not going to get there on its own, just like it did not get
there on its own with the two issues that I just mentioned. Is there
a cause for optimism? I do not know, but I would just point to a couple
things. First, last week the Business Roundtable issued a statement and
a set of objectives, specifically focusing on issues of race and inequality
in the United States.11 It did not get as much attention as last year’s
departure from shareholder privacy, but it is out there.
A number of companies are indeed facing a lot of controversy
regarding the way they handle these issues. Companies that have
a workforce that is less than 5% Black have now committed to much
higher hiring targets.12 The Black Lives Matter marches this summer
pursued high-profile ways of raising this issue on social media and
targeted companies for doing virtue signaling, but not actually taking
any action on these issues. Many companies have announced increased
hiring targets by race, so there is so much yet to be done and I am not
asserting that this is going to happen tomorrow. I would like to believe
that it is not just rhetoric here and that some real numbers have been
targeted, but it remains to be seen. California recently adopted some
targets for corporate boards along not just gender diversity, but also
taking into account race and ethnicity and other criteria.13

11. Business Roundtable Chairman Doug McMillon Establishes Special Committee
to Advance Racial Equity and Justice, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (June 5, 2020),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-chairman-doug-mcmillonestablishes-special-committee-to-advance-racial-equity-and-justice
[https://perma.cc/8AMC-73WH].
12. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Kevin Draper, Adidas Pledges to Increase Diversity.
Some Employees Want More, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/10/business/adidas-black-employees-discrimination.html
[https://perma.cc/Y629-CS4T].
13. Anne Steele, California Lawmakers Back Mandate for Racial Diversity on
Corporate Boards, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
california-lawmakers-mandate-racial-diversity-on-corporate-boards-11598915372
[https://perma.cc/WX77-D43R].

2021]

WHO MAKES ESG?

317

NICOLE MECCA: I agree, and I think this is a great time to shift
to a discussion of the workplace. What might signal that a company is
simply virtue signaling on an ethical issue like D&I, as opposed to
generating and maintaining organizational and cultural change?
MS. FAIRFAX: I think it is really important when we talk about
the diversity issue. Just to address the pipeline thing that Carmen has
raised—I love the way that she talked about it because she talked about
the changes that needed to occur in the workforce. I actually would go
a step farther and say that the so-called “pipeline problem” is a problem
created by the corporations themselves, who are not doing enough to
effectively hire, promote, and retain people of color in diverse
workforces.
Every study, including the most recent one by the Harvard Business
Review, basically says what we all know.14 There continues to be
discrimination in hiring, promotion in the workforce, etc. It is
problematic for companies to suggest that there is a problem and not to
acknowledge that they are the problem, that they are the ones clogging
the pipeline, if you will, in this area. I also think it is super important to
keep in mind that the pipeline becomes self-fulfilling because too often
companies do not look beyond title and do not focus enough on skill
sets, despite the fact that empirical evidence suggests that boards that
rely too much on CEOs actually do not perform well.15 That is not a
good proxy for good board performance—and yet to suggest that this is
the reason why we cannot find qualified people or why we cannot find
enough does not delve deeply enough into who gets deemed qualified
for these purposes. For the most part, boards can appoint anybody they
want to their board. There is no corporate law or securities law, other
than if you need a financial expert, that says who has to be on your
board. That is why there are some boards that have family members,
insiders, friends of friends, etc. So, I think we need to be mindful of how
people define the problem. I also think it is important to interrogate that
explanation or rather what I call “that excuse” to determine what it
really means, and how it may be getting in the way of real progress.

14. See, e.g., Lincoln Quillian et al., Hiring Discrimination Against Black
Americans Hasn’t Declined in 25 Years, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/10/hiring-discrimination-against-black-americans-hasnt-declinedin-25-years [https://perma.cc/6V5P-64T8].
15. Jeffery Sonnenfeld et al., What CEOs Really Think of Their Boards, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Apr. 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/04/what-ceos-really-think-of-their-boards
[https://perma.cc/X82G-LPM2].
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NICOLE MECCA: We can also shift to how employees can hold
their employers accountable to providing fair employment practices
such as fair benefits compensation and quality management.
MS. LU: Thanks, Nicole. Just circling quickly back to your first
question about how you can tell when companies are virtue signaling as
opposed to ensuring real change is happening in their workforce—I
think this is where disclosure comes into play. A lot of the information
that would be useful for holding companies accountable is not currently
required to be made public, but would be disclosed under the ESG
disclosure frameworks. Examples of such information include
information on gender diversity, employee retention rate, and how
employees are being promoted through the ranks. All this data is going
to be very helpful, especially when collected over the long term, for
identifying which companies are truly concerned about creating real
change and promoting D&I in their workforce. I think, in the long term,
what disclosure also allows is for employees, as well as other
stakeholders, to actively engage with companies to ensure their
accountability.
We have already started to see the first examples of investor push
for fairly aggressive disclosures. For example, over the summer, the
New York City Comptroller and a couple of pension funds asked
companies to disclose actual EEO-1 data.16 We also have ISS asking for
information from company boards about their gender and ethnicity
makeup.17 So as long as investors continue to push for this data to
become public, I think we are going to see greater strides. At least we
will be better equipped to identify those companies who are paying lip
service to diversity and those who are outperformers.
MR. WEBBER: I will just add that first of all, the New York City
pension funds have been at the forefront of these issues for decades,
engaging the “G” really seriously about five or six years ago, and

16. SCOTT M. STRINGER, NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, Comptroller Stringer,
NYC Funds Escalate Campaign Calling on Major Companies to Publicly Disclose
Workforce Demographics (Dec. 10, 2020), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/
comptroller-stringer-nyc-funds-escalate-campaign-calling-on-major-companies-topublicly-disclose-workforce-demographics [https://perma.cc/FEF2-LY5W].
17. ISS Policy Changes for 2021: Increased Expectations for Diversity and
Accountability, FENWICK & WEST LLP (2020), https://www.fenwick.com/insights/
publications/iss-policy-changes-for-2021-increased-expectations-for-diversity-andaccountability [https://perma.cc/CG3A-GBP2].
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pushing for proxy access after it was struck down by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, pushing environmental issues.18
Carmen just made the point on D&I issues, and I think this also just
leads into the discussion about human capital management and the
SEC’s recent action there.19 I would have liked to see them go further,
but it was a step, I think, in the right direction. I think it raises a really
important point that Lisa touched on very briefly earlier, but it is really
part of the problem—the classic cliché, “you manage what you
measure.” There has been so much historical emphasis on the C-suite,
on executive compensation, on executive performance, on the
backgrounds of executives and board members, and so on and so forth.
The securities laws emphasize disclosure of that kind of
performance and compensation. Lisa suggested earlier, in some ways,
the problem with that particular kind of emphasis is it reinforces
a misleading narrative for investors, and a misleading political
narrative—perhaps that is what really matters. “It is the five people at
the top. We will tell you everything you need to know about corporate
performance.” And that is just badly misleading. I think it is an artifact
of the sort of ideology of the CEO as superstar that we had back from
the ‘80s and ‘90s, the Jack Welch’s and the “Chainsaw Al” Dunlaps,
people like that, before we really had this sharper move towards
shareholder activism.
I think that the human capital management idea is going to allow
investors to peer much more deeply into corporate practices along all of
these dimensions. For example: D&I, but also everything that you
mentioned in your question too about benefits—compensation, training,
how you build effective workforces that do a good job, are committed to
the work, and are also rewarded for that work. So, I think there is a
growing realization and some movement in the right direction. We need
to be able to look more deeply. It is one thing to target board diversity
along a number of dimensions, but absolutely if we are going to make
these kinds of needed changes, we have to be able to peer more deeply
into the organization.
MS. FAIRFAX: There is almost nothing that I can add. You have
both said it right. This is what we mean by human capital management

18.
19.

See generally Bus. Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
See Press Release, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Adopts Rule Amendments to
Modernize Disclosures of Business, Legal Proceedings, and Risk Factors Under
Regulation S-K (Aug. 26, 2020), [hereinafter Regulation S-K amendments],
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-192 [https://perma.cc/3FZM-VUSZ].
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and why it is so important. You have all these studies talking about the
importance of intangible assets and their growth as a percentage of
a company’s market value.20 There is growing concern that we do not
know enough about how companies pay attention to these issues. What
are they doing about their D&I practices? What are they doing about
their labor pool and how stable it is? What does worker turnover look
like? How are they training their employees? We do not know enough
about how they are developing people for promotion, and as it turns out,
that is important information for us to understand. We cannot keep
thinking about employees as this financial outlay; they are a critical
asset that needs to be appropriately managed around all of these issues,
including the diversity issue, as we think about the demographic shifts in
the population. We must consider what that means for a company that is
not appropriately managing its labor pool so that they can take
advantage of those shifts in multiple different ways.
I agree absolutely that you cannot solve the concerns associated
with the workforce by getting information about the CEO’s salary, but
I think the disclosure around it was intended to respond to a different
concern. So it is not as if that information is not important. It is that it is
not going to really drive and help this other human capital management
piece, and we do need more information on that piece in order to really
understand how companies are doing in this area, an area that is
critically important.
NICOLE MECCA: Thank you. To continue the conversation
around the term human capital management, the SEC has waded into
this topic with its recent amendment to Regulation S-K.21 In particular,
what can we expect from the SEC’s latest rule?
MS. FAIRFAX: I have to fully disclose here that I was on the
investor advisory committee when we recommended that the SEC focus
on this issue. Certainly, the new rule falls very short of what we were
hoping would happen around this.
It is a step in the right direction, but the problem is there is no real
guidance and no specific disclosure requirements. There is sometimes
merit to a principle-based approach, I think, but in this case, we do not
really have the kind of detailed disclosure guidelines we were just
20. See, e.g., AON, 2019 INTANGIBLE ASSETS FINANCIAL STATEMENT IMPACT
COMPARISON REPORT (Apr. 2019), https://www.aon.com/getmedia/60fbb49a-c7a54027-ba98-0553b29dc89f/Ponemon-Report-V24.aspx [https://perma.cc/DW3G-C8AR].
21. See Regulation S-K amendments, supra note 19.
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talking about. There is also no direction about what kind of information
is salient or important. By way of example, it would have been a good
way to start in terms of thinking about what kind of information we need
to know to have a really good understanding of what companies are
doing in this area. While I think on the one hand, it acknowledges that
human capital management is important and that we need to see
information on it—in terms of doing something beyond that, I will take
a wait-and-see approach.
MS. LU: Speaking generally on the SEC and its approach to ESG,
I think the general approach and view taken by the SEC has been that of
regulatory caution. It has very much stood by its principle of “you
should disclose what is material to investors,” but the SEC has not gone
so far as recommending or requiring any specific ESG-style disclosures,
which is something that you actually do see across the Atlantic.
EU regulators have been a lot more forthright about mandating ESGspecific disclosures and that is something that the SEC has so far
declined to do. In terms of where we are going to get this information,
a lot of the pressure and momentum is going to come from the private
sector, namely initiatives from investors, and companies that really want
to demonstrate their leadership. So we will see a lot of development
coming out of the private sector in the United States rather than seeing
the SEC really taking the lead on these issues for now.
AVERY GOLOMBEK: With respect to ESG in the lifecycle of
a pension fund investment, could you speak to the types of conflicts that
arise in ESG-related negotiations between pension funds and general
partners?
MR. WEBBER: Sure, there are a lot of different ways to look at
that particular question. We were just talking about the New York City
Comptroller. Why don’t I touch on some interesting stuff that they have
done?
Recently, New York City adopted a responsible contractor policy
which applies to investments in infrastructure and in real estate.
The purpose of the responsible contractor policy is that when we make
such investments, we expect that responsible contractors are hired to do
the work; responsible contractors are those who deploy and pay
prevailing wages and benefits to workers and have strong safety records.
They do not have lots of litigation against them. Part of their assessment
in adopting that policy was investment-driven in the sense that work
sites that are run by union labor may have fewer accidents, less
litigation, better training, better compensation, and so forth.
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So what do you get from policies like that? The funny thing is, all
this sounds very new. But the reality is ingrained in the history of the
AFL-CIO housing investment trusts, the AFL-CIO Building Investment
Trust, and another entity called ULLICO—the Union Labor Life
Insurance Company—it was actually founded by Samuel Gompers, who
also founded the AFL-CIO. Initially, it was created to write life
insurance policies for workers for industrial accidents when no one else
would write such policies—it is still around. It has been around for
many decades and they have always had investment practices where
they invest in projects where those projects hire union labor.
Right now, ULLICO is investing alongside Carlyle in building
Terminal One at JFK Airport.22 These investments are going on across
the country, and they are going on through and with private equity funds
that are investing in these projects with them. This is part of the deal
between New York City and other pension funds and P.E. firms engaged
in these types of projects. I think that this is one way forward for labor
and pension funds on the “S” part of ESG.
I would like to spin an optimistic scenario for a second, if we are
still allowed to have any optimism. There is widespread recognition that
there are serious infrastructure deficiencies in the United States, and
potentially trillions of dollars of investment in that space.23 One can tell
a story in which worker pension funds can play a role of investing in
those types of projects while creating union jobs, and importantly
bringing new workers and new contributors into these pension funds.
I will not dwell on it, but this is where there is often a breakdown
between shareholder returns over in one corner, and on environmental or
social benefits being something totally different. The reality is that these
things can be self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing, so pension funds can
get there without just operating on returns. There are three legs to the
stool: returns, worker contributions, and employer contributions.
So those are really big issues for multi-employer pensions, for labor
22. See Press Release, THE CARLYLE GRP., The New Terminal One at JFK
Continues Progress with Approval of Proposed Lease by The Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey’s Board (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.carlyle.com/mediaroom/news-release-archive/new-terminal-one-jfk-continues-progress-approvalproposed-lease [https://perma.cc/92A2-CJMX].
23. See Jim Tankersley, Biden Details $2 Trillion Plan to Rebuild Infrastructure
and Reshape the Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/03/31/business/economy/biden-infrastructure-plan.html [https://perma.cc/4DUUALUE].
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union funds, and for public pension funds. This is one potential way to
look at the model between pension fund investors and private equity
funds—the point was made in the earlier panel today.
In the private equity space, these pension funds are estimated—
public pension funds in particular—to constitute somewhere between
a third and up to 50% of total assets under management by private
equity.24 That is an opportunity for these funds to exercise a lot of say
over how that money is invested, how it is deployed, and importantly,
how it should not be deployed. I think we are going to see more of that
going forward.
MS. FAIRFAX: I want to add that I have done a lot of work around
shareholder activism and engagement.25 What that work has surfaced is
that there are a lot of areas in which PE and pension funds are aligning
where you would not classically expect. One of the reasons why the
governance pushes were so successful was not just because of activist
shareholders, but because of the alliances that those shareholders were
able to build amongst other shareholders and the shareholder base.
While it is true that shareholders may have competing and different
interests, there are some ways in which they have found common
ground. They have been able to work together in interesting ways and
we are going to see that play out.
What these mini-cycles of financial stress have demonstrated is that
everything is interconnected. It is not that what David is talking about in
terms of pension fund investment is different—it means that when you
name a particular shareholder, underneath that shareholder is probably
other types of shareholders, who may have the ability to find some
common ground around things that they are concerned about.
MS. LU: We all talk about major institutional investors—
BlackRock, State Street, the major pension funds—really being at the
forefront of pushing for ESG, but sometimes we forget the reason why:
because, as Lisa mentioned, they are investing on behalf of ordinary
people. As millennials and the generations below them enter the
24. See OECD, ANNUAL SURVEY OF LARGE PENSION FUNDS AND PUBLIC PENSION
RESERVE FUNDS 6 (2019), http://www.oecd.org/finance/survey-large-pension-funds.htm
[https://perma.cc/9YCV-EB5U].
25. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism: The Emergence,
Impact, and Future of Shareholder Activism as the New Corporate Governance Norm,
99 B.U. L. REV. 1301 (2019); Lisa M. Fairfax, Social Activism Through Shareholder
Activism, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1129 (2019); Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder
Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the Effectiveness of Increased
Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1 (2008).
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workforce, their priorities on how their money should be invested differ
from previous generations.26
Institutional shareholders must align their investment strategies
with the demands and concerns of their clients, and there is a major
grassroots push that is driving the current wave of focus on ESG. I think
we will see the trend continue to accelerate in parallel with demographic
changes where millennials, women, and minorities continue to accrue
greater wealth.
MR. WEBBER: I will make just one more point here about
pensions, private equity, and ESG to kind of illustrate how chasing
returns to the exclusion of everything else can have very perverse
effects. One of the things that I looked at in some earlier work was
public pension fund investments in privatization.27 You had public
pension funds that were investing through private equity in the
privatization of prisons, privatization of schools, privatization of public
school services, privatization of firefighting, privatization of police and
security, all the way down the line.
I interviewed someone who worked as a custodian at a school in
Massachusetts. He had been making $20 an hour, worked there for
many years, had good benefits.28 His public pension was invested in
a private equity pool that turned around and bought Aramark, which
then came into that town and underbid the union for the school’s
contract. This guy, who had been making $20 an hour, was offered his
old job back for $8.50 an hour. This was financed with his own
retirement funds.
This was not an isolated case—this was a problem with public
pension funds investing in private equity. You may say, “What if there
were good returns on the investment?” But a lot of these workers lost
their jobs. That is a loss of payments into the funds by both the workers
and the employers themselves. So it is not so easy to just tease out. That
is an example where even good return on investment could undermine

26. See LPL FINANCIAL, How Different Generations Invest, WEBSTER NEWS (July
8, 2020), https://public.websteronline.com/articles/investments-insights/how-differentgenerations-invest [https://perma.cc/HM8B-2QGN].
27. See David H. Webber, Opinion, Protecting Public Pension Investments, WASH.
POST (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-h-webberprotecting-public-pension-investments/2014/11/20/85748ee6-66cb-11e4-836c83bc4f26eb67_story.html [https://perma.cc/VZA2-6KXS].
28. Id.
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the fund itself, which we think of as not being possible, but it is
possible.
We increasingly see this kind of pattern emerging in other parts of
ESG, in particular in the “E” space. There is increasingly a kind of
collapse between returns and other forms of benefits to these funds that
are making these investments.
MS. FAIRFAX: It shows that the issue is extremely complicated.
MR. WEBBER: I agree.
AVERY GOLOMBEK: One of the fiercest critics of ESG and
stakeholder capitalism has been Lucian Bebchuk, who has argued that
stakeholder capitalism and the tenets of ESG would reduce management
and board accountability.29 How should boards and management parse
through different stakeholder interests and manage potential conflicts?
MS. FAIRFAX: I think that the concern that Bebchuk raises is one
that often gets raised in this conversation: For whom should the board
and the corporation govern? Is the obligation strictly to shareholders and
their profit maximization concerns? That is a single-choice proposition,
whereas obligations to groups of stakeholders involves the possibility
that the board and management can play groups off of one another.
Accountable to everyone essentially means accountable to no one;
that is the argument. While you can understand that concept, I think his
argument ignores the reality that boards and managers are already doing
this. This is actually what we expect them to do. We expect them to
balance the interest of different stakeholders. If you imagine this
moment right now, where corporations are struggling to decide what to
do during the pandemic, they have on the one hand employees whose
health and safety concerns they have to think about. On the other hand,
they have consumers, but this is what they are in the business of doing.
They have to be in the business of what they are doing in order to
manage and oversee a large corporation, so I think the reality is that they
are already doing this.
The reason why I suggest it is not a concern is that they are already
doing it. What I think is important about naming the fact that they are
doing it is so that we are able to spotlight it and really be able to figure
out who is doing it well. Shedding light on best practices is the whole

29. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of
Stakeholder Governance, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 2, 2020)
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholdergovernance [https://perma.cc/U3PQ-ZYG6].
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point. The business endeavor is about people making decisions, some of
them that may work and others that may fall flat.
We have got to try to figure out which ones work and which ones
do not. How to make tradeoffs is the whole point of this endeavor.
By allowing people to engage in potentially risky tradeoffs where there
is no particular right answer, you are just trying to kind of do the best by
the institution. So to the extent that is concerning, of course it is, but that
is business. That is my view.
MR. WEBBER: I think that the Bebchuk concern is real, but I think
it is also overstated and may not even be that real—I am not so sure.
Lisa already stated the premise of that critique, which is if we all know
there is only one score and one metric that matters, we can hold
everybody accountable to share price and that is it. If you loosen it up at
all and say, we care about the environment or we did this for workers,
then there goes the accountability. Realistically speaking, we tend to
evaluate companies in light of their competitors, in light of other entities
of the industry. If one entity’s share price is getting pummeled, and they
claim that they are only getting pummeled because they are doing all
this great stuff for workers and for the environment—I think it is going
to be looked at skeptically. It is a question of being able to balance these
things to let whole industries move in particular directions.
Secondly, I think that there is more to life than just managerial
accountability. The reality is it does not tell us enough about whether
this is the right direction to move. There might well be a little bit less
managerial accountability because they are taking other things into
consideration. What we really want to know is, maybe so, but we can
still benefit overall from managers being able to take other things into
consideration along these other dimensions. The single-minded focus on
just the issue of managerial accountability is not good enough.
There is also this artificiality to the argument that I think continues
to break down, because many shareholders want this stuff. Many
shareholders want more environmental accountability, more labor
friendliness, labor protection, economic equality, diversity—they are
concerned about these issues too. So shareholder primacy is not exactly
the same thing as maximized returns.
There are so many different pieces moving here, but ultimately,
I think we need to know much more even if we can see that there is a
little bit less managerial accountability, which I am skeptical of anyway.
If it advances these other metrics, then I think we might benefit from it.
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Finally, the last point here really is there is so much inside the
system as it currently exists to keep shareholder interests on the table.
The quarterly reporting, the leak tables and performance and so forth,
the idea that shareholder interests go out the window and managers can
do whatever they want. Again, I just think it is possibly a real concern,
but I think it is overstated.
MS. LU: Adding to what Lisa and David mentioned, the
importance of stakeholder capitalism is also about empowering the
board to act in the long term interests of the company and about creating
a company that is primed for sustainable long term growth, as opposed
to being focused on short term growth and high stock prices in the short
term, which may serve the interests of a select number of shareholders
but may not actually serve the larger company, especially in the long
run. For example, if a company could easily continue to do well in the
short term without taking into account the risks relating to climate
change; or takes seriously its human capital policies but fails to invest in
research, development, and innovation; or fails to invest in the
workforce, it will not be sustainable over the long term.
If you are not capturing all the ESG risks and considering the
concerns of your community, your suppliers, and your customers, you
are not able to build a sustainable business. That is where stakeholder
governance comes in, because it allows the board to take into account
these issues and take a stance against short-termist thinking without
risking punishment. That is what is really important here. I would
counter the Bebchuk argument about less accountability. You would
have less accountability by solely focusing on share prices because that
does not account for how a company is going to perform over the
medium to long run, which is what most people who are invested in
companies care about. Most people are not flipping stocks, they are
investing their life savings with a 10, 20, or 30-year horizon.
TAYLOR WELLS: Shifting the conversation a little bit to
millennial involvement in ESG, I want to ask the classic question:
Today’s fight for ESG appears to pit young versus old, for example,
millennials fighting to address climate change facing off against the
large shareholder base of pension and retirement funds. How should the
timeless problem of young versus old—here, stakeholders versus
shareholders—be approached today?
MR. WEBBER: First of all, I should just say that those types of
conflicts are, I think, overstated. In my opinion, it is not really true that
baby boomers are saying to themselves, “Let the planet burn, I don’t
have much time left anyway.” I do not think that this is really the baby
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boomer attitude, and in any case, those types of conflicts have always
existed within every single pension fund and every single investment
fund.
If you look at every pension fund, if it makes an investment that
pays off in 10 years, or two years, or 20 years, it is going to benefit
some workers at the expense of others. There is this so-called duty of
impartiality that is implied. I am talking about on the investment side,
not necessarily the corporate side. This duty of impartiality really is not
that muscular because of precisely the concerns just identified, unless
you truly are favoring one set of beneficiaries over another. You are not
really running afoul of the duty of impartiality.
I will plug a paper that I have forthcoming with Michal Barzuza
and Quinn Curtis, both of the University of Virginia.30 We talk about the
rise of the millennials, in particular, to state the theory or hypothesis of
the paper: why ESG? Why is it suddenly becoming so important now?
Why has it moved from something that was once marginal, into
something that is core? In particular, we focus on the big three index
funds in that paper.31 We ask, why have they suddenly become more
active voting in favor of environmental proposals and voting? Why have
they started targeting board diversity and issues like that?
Our hypothesis is that it really is about the fight to manage
millennial money. It is about the fight to manage millennial investment
dollars.32 These entities do not compete on what they invest in. The
index funds all buy exactly the same thing. Their costs have essentially
been whittled down to zero. What do they compete on? What is left to
compete over assets under management?
Carmen alluded to this earlier, but there is a lot of social science
research that shows that the millennials have very different attitudes
from baby boomers and Gen X along two dimensions. One is their
actual political views and political attitudes. Millennials’ view on the
environment and social issues are just different in many respects from
Gen X and the baby boomers. The second, and I think even more
consequential attitudinal difference, is that millennials say again and
again—and there is a lot of anecdotal evidence to support that they mean

30. See generally Michal Barzuza et. al., Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG
Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243
(2020).
31. See id. at 1253.
32. See id. at 1303, 1320.
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it—that they are much more comfortable living their politics, not just in
the voting booth, but at the office, in the way they shop, and in the
investment choices that they make. I think we are seeing that. I think
that we are seeing in terms of them saying that it is important to them to
work at a company that they believe is doing sustainable, socially useful
work. It is important to them to buy products like that, and it is
important to them to invest accordingly.
Part of our theory is that part of the reason that these investment
managers are talking the ESG talk, and to some extent walking that walk
as well, is over the efforts to appeal to millennials who now are
predicted to be three quarters of the workforce by 2030, and who are
now really making investment choices that tend to be kind of sticky.33
If you invest in that 401(k) with one entity in your 20s, there is a decent
chance that you will still be with them for years and years, whereas the
boomers are already in, the Gen X people are already in. So I think that
is what is driving a lot of why ESG is taking center stage now.
MS. FAIRFAX: David is absolutely right. All the evidence is
showing us a lot about this generation. How are they willing to spend
their money? What they are willing to spend their money on? The fact
that they are willing to put their dollars in businesses and in products if
they think it reflects their values; how reputation matters.
I too am resisting, as is David, this notion of us versus them.
Rather, this is the evolution of a changing world and a changing
economy. A changing understanding of what the long term means has
got to happen when you have a generation that grew up with
expectations that other generations did not have. This is a generation
that grew up with expectations around concern for the environment.
This is a generation that grew up with expectations about diversity, real
or imagined, signaling or not. The truth is this generation has an
expectation of what their workforce is supposed to look like, has an
expectation about what those practices are supposed to reflect, and
a generation that has proven that they will put their dollars where those
expectations are. That is the key.
They have said in their consumer spending patterns, in their
investment patterns, even in their kind of choice of work patterns that it
matters so much to us that this is where we are going to put our
resources, and you have to be cognizant of that as you think about the
33. See, e.g., Clemens Sialm, Laura T. Starks & Hanjiang Zhang, Defined
Contribution Pension Plans: Sticky or Discerning Money?, 70 J. FIN. 805, 806–07
(2015).
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long term and what it means for that generation to have control of
significant assets and resources for the next 30 or 40 years.
MS. LU: If we also look at the demographics of millennials today,
it is really different from previous generations. Millennials today are one
of the most educated generations, so they are incredibly sophisticated
and understand the investment propositions that have been put in front
of them. They realize that it is a financial imperative, not just a moral
imperative, to think about climate change or questions about diversity
and inclusion, because all these things, ultimately, will likely have a real
bottom line impact on the value of investments over a long horizon.
Millennials today are also incredibly diverse, far more diverse than
prior generations. Women hold much more wealth than prior
generations, so that is where diversity and inclusion becomes a real
issue, because the millennials entering the workforce are realizing that
the issues of the past remain today. They are asking questions about
what can be done to change institutions, and many of them are using
their investments to push for change. I think we are at the initial phase
of a wave of change because the generation behind the Millennials is
just starting to enter the workforce and they are even more educated and
even more diverse.
MS. FAIRFAX: I would also add that this understanding of the
impact of ESG targets on investments and on returns is something we
have to unpack. I think one of the latest studies I saw was a metaanalysis of many studies, going back over a decade, from the
Department of Labor (DOL).34 It found that most people believe that if
they invest with an ESG focus, they are going to have to sacrifice some
profits.35 The empirical evidence does not bear that out: most of the
empirical evidence supports the proposition that investing with those
types of goals and targets will have you, at the very least, on the same
level as conventional investing, if not better.
I think the first panel said this—we have got to pull the ESG out.
This is investing with these types of things in mind, and in fact, the
evidence points to the fact that it is an investment that will give you

34. See generally DEP’T OF LAB., ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE
(ESG) INVESTMENT TOOLS: A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT FIELD 14 (Dec. 2017),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OASP/legacy/files/ESG-Investment-ToolsReview-of-the-Current-Field.pdf [https://perma.cc/53PY-W84K].
35. Id.
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a good return. So that is something that people need to be mindful of as
well.
MS. LU: ESG funds have actually performed quite well during the
pandemic, and have in many instances outperformed the market.36 The
fact that ESG funds have proven themselves to be able to withstand
severe market shocks is further evidence that taking this approach to
investing is going to serve investors well, or at the very least, put them
in the same position in most cases.
MR. WEBBER: You can also look at it in the negative, as not only
in terms of affirmative investments in growing sustainable industries,
but also avoiding industries that do not fit those criteria. Following the
logic of the millennial argument here, we can look at companies that
were badly hit when they handled these kinds of issues in a bad way.
Whether it is Starbucks coming out and banning its employees from
wearing Black Lives Matter pins, then turning around and not only
reversing itself after an outcry, but buying 250,000 Black Lives Matter
T-shirts, and distributing them to their workers; 37 or that episode at Papa
John’s38—this conduct had a serious negative impact on each company.
Sometimes ESG is depicted as painting a rosy picture of investing in the
right stuff, but it is also about avoiding the harm that is caused when you
really alienate your employees, your customers, or your shareholders. If
you alienate your employees or your customers, it can have effects on
your share price.
Again, it just underscores the point that the siloed way of looking at
these things is inadequate—particularly when you have a rising
generation that does not silo its politics into the voting booth alone—and
decisionmakers have to take the ESG side into account here alongside
the legal side and the corporate side of these issues, too.

36. Esther Whieldon & Robert Clark, ESG Funds Beat Out S&P 500 in 1st Year of
COVID-19; How 1 Fund Shot to the Top, S&P GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Apr. 6, 2021),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/esg-funds-beat-out-s-p-500-in-1st-year-of-covid-19-how-1-fund-shot-to-thetop-63224550 [https://perma.cc/5WB7-Y6TX].
37. See Lauren Aratani, Starbucks Reverses Stance and Allows Staff to Wear Black
Lives Matter Clothing, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2020/jun/12/starbucks-black-lives-matter-clothing
[https://perma.cc/DC8P6LM4].
38. Noah Kirsch, Papa John’s Founder Used N-Word on Conference Call, FORBES
(July 11, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/noahkirsch/2018/07/11/papa-johnsfounder-john-schnatter-allegedly-used-n-word-on-conference-call/?sh=7b537c214cfc
[https://perma.cc/8CGF-SV9D].
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TAYLOR WELLS: Regarding millennials’ investment and ESG,
research has shown the millennials are the first generation that are
projected to be generally less wealthy than their predecessors. How will
this affect millennials’ ability to implement long-lasting ESG values in
mainstream corporate culture?
MR. WEBBER: I think not that much, because even if that is true,
per capita, that is not true in terms of the overall size of this generation.
It is a much bigger generation than my own gen, Gen X, as Larry Fink
recently pointed out.39 The millennials are on the threshold of inheriting
somewhere from $12 trillion to as much as $30 trillion. 40 It is the largest
intergenerational asset transfer in the history of the world, and
collectively, that generation is going to be massively powerful.41
As I said, 75% of the workforce by 2030,42 with huge inheritances and
wielding lots of market power, lots of consumer power.
So I am not sure. I am always a little bit skeptical about those types
of projections, but I think even if it is true, on a per capita level, it is not
true in the aggregate. I think that they are not going to be thwarted for
that reason. There may be other reasons, but not that one.
MS. LU: Going off what David mentioned, I think we will hear in
the press and the news about the struggles of millennials in terms of
their ability to acquire wealth. I think, in many ways, the experience has
also made millennials perhaps more aware and more concerned about
ESG issues. Millennials have experienced significant challenges, such as
mounting student debt challenges, two major recessions, and the
39. See Richard Fry, Millenials Overtake Baby Boomers as America’s Largest
Generation, PEW RSCH. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/04/28/millennials-overtake-baby-boomers-as-americas-largest-generation
[https://perma.cc/5UN6-Y6WH]; Julia Horowitz, BlackRock Is Getting Ready for
Millennial Investors, CNN (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/04/
investing/blackrock-millennial-push [https://perma.cc/V5GL-UHHC].
40. See Ben Eisen & Anne Tergesen, Older Americans Stockpiled a Record $35
Trillion. The Time Has Come to Give It Away, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2021, 10:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/older-americans-35-trillion-wealth-giving-away-heirsphilanthropy-11625234216 [https://perma.cc/2L86-TZ3G].
41. See Liz Skinner, The Great Wealth Transfer is Coming, Putting Advisers at
Risk, INVESTMENTNEWS (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.investmentnews.com/the-greatwealth-transfer-is-coming-putting-advisers-at-risk-63303
[https://perma.cc/MU6RTYQM].
42. DELOITTE,
THE
DELOITTE
MILLENNIAL
SURVEY
2
(2014),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-Deloitte/gxdttl-2014-millennial-survey-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LTW2-5MR7].
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accompanying career setbacks. All these experiences do fold into how
they make investment decisions. As David mentioned, it is probably
going to impact the overall trend and push towards ESG in the longer
run.
MARIE BOGENEZ: I want to discuss the most recent proposed
rule from the Department of Labor.43 It seems from the rule that it would
discourage managers of ERISA covered pension plans from actually
considering ESG issues when making their investments. What do you
think will be the long term impact of that rule, if it were to be
implemented?
MR. WEBBER: It depends how long-term we are talking about
here. My own view is that it will not. If it is implemented it will not
linger for very long. It may not be implemented or may not even be
implemented for very long, depending on the outcome of the election in
a couple weeks.
In my own view and those of my co-authors on that piece—because
we think that this is so important to millennials, we think that market
pressures in favor of ESG will continue to be enormous, and we think
that ultimately the DOL’s ability to really constrain this kind of activity
is going to be limited. It would be limited even if the current
administration stays in business for another four years. If it does not,
it will be more than just limited, it may just be eliminated and may never
fully be implemented.
It is interesting to note, if you look at the many comment letters
objecting to this new ESG standard, that the objections do not come
from the Bernie Sanders crowd. They are coming from very, very
mainstream investment managers who are opposed to this. DOL has
started essentially trying to harass some investment managers by
demanding all sorts of documentation in wanting to see why they made
certain decisions along ESG lines and so forth, and that is a real cost and
also a little bit alarming to folks who have been targeted by it.44
I suppose we should tell the political backstory, which is that the
energy industry went to the Trump White House and complained about
all this ESG stuff, shareholder proposals and so forth. The White House
issued an executive order to the DOL to look into this fiduciary stuff,
and that is why we got a flurry of this action from DOL over the
summer. There are a lot of other investors out there other than those
43. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846, 72846–87
(Nov. 13, 2020).
44. See id. at 72879.
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governed by ERISA, including all the public pension plans. So given the
market pressures in this direction, given the demand from customers,
employees, investors, and millennials, I do not expect this to be the
death knell of ESG that I think some of the folks who implemented this
guidance hope it will be, but time will tell.
MS. FAIRFAX: It is particularly concerning because it is based on
a false premise that we have all been highlighting, which is the
assumption that considerations around ESG do not align with or advance
financial goals. The reason that you are getting at, David, suggests that
these traditional funds and fund managers are pushing against
a restriction like this is because it absolutely has an impact on financial
goals. So, it is concerning to say these funds could not take that into
account, recognizing that market pressure translates into money, into
finances, into performance. The DOL’s own study just three years ago
said when you look at the meta-analysis of all of the studies around ESG
investing, they show that type of investing either performs as well as or
outperforms conventional investments.45 So what are they doing right
now?
It is good of David to tell the political story behind the story, but
certainly the question of what type of impact we expect it to have—if it
remains in the long term, I think it could have a concerning impact. I do
recognize that, in fact, there is some financial hit that you will take if
you are not allowed to engage around these issues.
As Carmen was suggesting, at this moment we are seeing these
funds outperform the market, and researchers and analysts are saying it
is because funds that invest and consider in this way are a proxy for
resiliency. Sustainability is a proxy for resilience, it is a proxy for being
able to weather the storm because you have taken into account some
really important risk factors that other companies may have blind spots
around. I think that whatever happens in November, the market will
speak for itself around whether or not this makes sense. I think,
ultimately, the market will demand the ability to continue to invest in
the way that is most beneficial and the evidence suggests an inclusion of
these types of factors.
MS. LU: Quickly adding to what Lisa and David just said, I think
there are still folks out there who do not believe that ESG has a positive
impact, or at least a neutral impact on investment outcomes. I think that
45. See SUMMIT CONSULTING, ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE (ESG)
INVESTMENT TOOLS: A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT FIELD 14 (2017).
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group is getting smaller and smaller over time, and if we look at the
trends right now, the influx of money into ESG funds is far greater than
investments into regular funds. As long as this trend continues to persist,
as Lisa mentioned, the market will speak for itself. There will ultimately
be market demand for access to ESG-managed funds, and so I think it is
really a question of time. As long as ESG continues to outperform and
do well, then I think that the data itself will become irrefutable.
AJ HARRIS: Over these last fifteen minutes, we would like to
address some questions posed by the audience. The first question is: Are
employee resource groups effective for promoting D&I, and if not, what
can be done to make them more effective outlets within these firms?
MS. FAIRFAX: Certainly, all of the studies around the D&I work
at companies suggest that it is a top to bottom, bottom to top endeavor,
and that you need to have buy-in from everybody and intentionality
around all of the things that you do to both kind of recognize the places
where there may be inequities as a result of race and to counteract those
inequities. So I think it depends. I will end with what I started with:
it depends.
What is the makeup of the group? What is their charge? What we
sometimes see with the groups that are tasked with D&I efforts is that
companies tend to put the least powerful of the employees, with the
vaguest of charges and the least amount of resources, and tell them to try
to fix the problem that permeates the entire institution. Turns out, that is
not going to work. But if you have a group of people who are dedicated
to getting something done, who have the power and the resources to get
it done, and who are willing to have difficult conversations to make
difficult decisions, then yes, it could matter.
AJ HARRIS: Another question is whether an increased emphasis
on diversity is potentially a way of maximizing the value for
shareholders because diversity reduces support for taxes and social
spending and may make it more difficult for workers to organize.
MR. WEBBER: There is a long chain of reasoning in that question
that I am not sure I embrace, so I am not quite sure how to answer that.
I mean, what do you mean by worker organizing—is it investors, or do
you mean unions?
AJ HARRIS: I think what the audience member is asking, in the
bigger picture, is: If the efforts to increase diversity at a firm are
successful, you have less political pressure on other firms to make these
changes, and as a result, you may face less political pressure for taxes.
If you have greater diversity efforts, you have a happier workforce, and
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with a happier workforce, you face less push back for, let us say, union
effort.
MR. WEBBER: I see. There is a familiar argument that gets made
in this space all the time, which is if you take your environmental issues,
you take diversity. If you take any of these issues into the marketplace,
into the corporation, does this incentivize making the changes in
Washington or legislatively? Is there a sort of zero sum game? No.
If you are directing your resources into one space, that does not mean
you are not directing it somewhere else. It is related to a book I wrote. 46
I am not sure it focused so much on the diversity piece, but rather on
how many resources a union, for example, should put into shareholder
activism, versus into recruiting new unionized workers, versus into
electoral politics. Institutions have to make these choices with scarce
resources from my own perspective.
I think that in the world that we are living in, in the 21st century,
nobody can get away. No matter what issue you care about, you just
cannot ignore what is going on in the marketplace. It is just not enough.
There is too much power and influence in the private sector to ignore.
Some of it is a story about gridlock in Washington. Some of it is just a
story of capacity. It is just not enough anymore, in my view, to focus on
legislative strategies alone, or on litigation strategies alone, or on
regulatory strategies alone. Particularly in a world where markets
operate globally and government regulation is still local—it is a serious
asymmetry. And given the fact that markets operate globally as well,
investors can also operate globally in a way that the sort of traditional
tools of legislation or regulation do not. So I just do not see how you can
ignore this space.
If you care about the facts on the ground and almost anything
happening in the real world, you cannot ignore this space. Whether and
to what extent your efforts in one space may undermine or detract from
your efforts is a complicated question. It is a fair question, but I think,
no matter how you come out on that one, you cannot ignore the space,
you just cannot.
MS. FAIRFAX: I would just add one follow-up on that, to the
extent I understand the question. There is a reason why the Black Lives
Matter movement turned from a movement that was about protesting
and people in the streets, that focused on the criminal justice system,
46. See generally DAVID H. WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING CLASS
SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (Harv. Univ. Press 2018).
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towards pressuring the corporation and issues like that. There is
a connectedness there. So David is right, these things intersect and
people are sophisticated enough to understand the intersection. It cannot
be viewed as a zero sum game. It is not an “either-or”; it is a “both-and.”
MS. LU: Going off briefly from what David and Lisa just said,
I think if you look at the most recent Business Roundtable statement,
what was interesting was that when they were talking about promoting
racial equity and reducing justice, they also mentioned that aside from
the private sector initiatives, they also talked about lobbying the
government and proposing public policy proposals. I think that
is interesting because it is an implicit recognition by the private sector
that they have tremendous political influence. I think change in the
private sector is particularly important, and I think any political changes
will likely require cooperation from the private sector.
AJ HARRIS: I would close by asking for your future projections
for the space in the next five years or so. What are some reasonable
goals, and what are the realistic odds of their success in the foreseeable
future?
MS. LU: I think the biggest challenge right now is creating an
effective disclosure system for corporations so that there is a baseline
from which people can understand how ESG is being dealt with, how
risks and opportunities are being managed, and how to differentiate
companies. I think we will see a lot of movement in the next couple of
months because we are seeing a lot of push in the private sector for a
coherent disclosure framework, and that in turn will likely trigger,
hopefully, more effective disclosures from companies.
Also, to recognize companies that are outperforming their peers.
I think that will be one of those critical goals. I think looking further
afield, it is hard to predict where this is going to go, but if we look at
recent trends in terms of investing and the scope and scale and
investment in ESG, it has grown exponentially. It has not just been
a steady increase, it has really dramatically exploded in the last couple
months. I think if this trend continues, all the debate and old debate and
skepticism may slowly erode, and what you will really see is a greater
focus on how we deal with these issues. How do we calibrate risks and
opportunities? How do we determine the best governance practices?
Companies are looking to address this, both on the board level and also
throughout management, because addressing ESG is not simply about
what is happening at the top. It is also about how that gets filtered down
all through the bottom, and this is particularly the case with issues such
as D&I.
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MR. WEBBER: I will focus quickly just on the “S.” I hope we are
going to see it—it has been talked about forever. I hope we are going to
do more for workers in this country and I hope we are going to see some
serious infrastructure spending that could potentially put millions of
people back to work or secure their current jobs, resulting also in
payments into retirement funds and having all sorts of salutary effects.
I think that if such an infrastructure investment plan does come down,
it is not going to be just in the form of a big check from the government;
hopefully, there will be a significant check from the government, but
a lot of it is going to come from the private sector and from tax
incentives that might be created in such a plan to make such
investments.
One very positive way we might see some of the “S” in action
would be for pension funds and investment funds to use their power and
make these infrastructure investments to ensure that workers are getting
a good, fair bargain with respect to prevailing wages and benefits when
they work on such projects. That has been shown to be profitable. It has
been shown to create returns, and I also think it would be good for a lot
of people in this country who need it.
MS. FAIRFAX: I agree with both of those comments, in particular
the focus on the workers, because I think human capital management is
a very important and live issue. I am hopeful that we will make some
headway on that. I think it is likely to be in fits and starts. I think
disclosure is the same way, not only better and more meaningful
disclosure, but some standardization. That is going to be the most
helpful piece of the disclosure, and I expect fits and starts there too.
We will get to a place after finding some convergence around what
people feel are best practices that the SEC will pick up from. I imagine,
there will be regulation in this space, but probably not until there is
some significant agreement around best practices.
The last thing I will say is the goal with regard to ESG target
metrics is to obtain credible commitments. You have to move from the
rhetoric to the credible commitment. If you do not measure it, it does not
matter. So we need to be thinking about what credible commitments
look like in this space. Is it tied to executive compensation? Is it realistic
targets and goals? What is it? This is the second wave of that push. How
do we hold feet to the fire and make companies have credible
commitments in this space? I suspect that too will be in fits and starts.

FIRESIDE CHAT
DIANNA LAM: Welcome back everyone. We are very excited that
Former Chief Justice Strine, one of the foremost authorities on Delaware
law and a leading voice in ESG, has agreed to serve as our keynote
speaker. Although he needs no introduction, please allow me to remind
you of a few of his many, many, many accomplishments.
Chief Justice Strine served on the Delaware Supreme Court from
2014 until 2019 after previously serving as Vice Chancellor and then
Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. He has written hundreds
of opinions in the area of corporate law and contract law, trusts and
estates, criminal, administrative, and constitutional law. His opinions are
among the most influential in Delaware, and particularly in the area of
corporate law everywhere. The Chief Justice holds long standing
teaching positions at Harvard Law and the Penn Carey School of Law,
and he also holds distinguished fellowships at both of these law schools
and Columbia Law. He is a member of the American Law Institute
where he served as an advisor on the project to create a restatement of
corporate law. From 2006 to 2019 he served as the special judicial
consultant to the ABA Committee on corporate law. He also was the
special judicial consultant to the ABA Committee on mergers and
acquisitions from 2014 to 2019. Among his many awards, in 2000,
Governor Carper awarded Chief Justice Strine the Order of the First
State. In 2002, President David Roselle of the University of Delaware
presented him with the University’s citation for Outstanding
Achievement. In 2006, he was selected as a Henry Crown Fellow at the
Aspen Institute. In 2019, he was awarded an honorary degree from
Washington College in Chestertown, Maryland.
We are honored that among his many speaking engagements, he
has chosen to serve as our keynote speaker. I will now turn it over to
Professor Sean Griffith.
PROF. GRIFFITH: Thank you, Dianna. Chief Justice, welcome.
HON. STRINE: It is great to be with you Sean.
PROF. GRIFFITH: It is a pleasure to have you here. Well, virtually
here.
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HON. STRINE: So, it’s virtual happy hour and I expect everybody
on the phone to feel free to drink.
PROF. GRIFFITH: We are all virtually happy already. Chief
Justice, I’d like to talk about some of the recent work that you have been
doing, and the big picture policy proposals that you have been writing
about and thinking about since leaving the bench.
My first question for you is to remark on the scope and scale of the
thinking that you have been doing since you left the bench. These ideas
that you have been coming up with, and the papers that you put out this
summer, can really be seen as large-scale reforms of the way that
capitalism might work in the United States. They are much broader in
scope, as I said, than even the most wide-ranging judicial opinion.
So, I would like to invite you to talk a bit about the things that you are
thinking about now and how they may or may not connect to the kind of
thinking that you did as a foremost jurist on the foremost corporate law
bench.
HON. STRINE: Sean, I’m really glad you actually ask this question
because there’s nothing really new about my focus. When I was on the
bench, for example, I wrote an article and I gave a lecture on these
larger topics in 2006. I talked about how my hairline was a tribute to my
first political hero who was running for president then. That was thenSenator Biden who was running in the primaries in the 2006–07 cycle
running up to 2008. That article was called the Shared Interest of
Corporate Managers and Workers in Corporate Governance Reform.1
It actually turned into a symposium and people like my friend Damon
Silvers, who is head of policy at the AFL-CIO, and Jack Bogle
responded.2 They address many of the themes that my recent work does.
I’ve written widely throughout the century on the need to rebalance our
corporate governance system. I think it’s telling, though, that the work
has gotten more attention recently. It’s not because I’m saying anything
particularly new—it’s because what has been happening in our
economic and corporate governance systems does not work and has
created economic insecurity and inequality, and that’s finally getting the
attention it deserves.

1. Symposium, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1 (2007).
2. Id.
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It has long been a concern of mine that what the “is” is about our
corporate governance system is a long way from the “ought,” and in
terms of my work as a judge, it is easy to see, given where I was sitting
in Delaware, the pressures under which public company managers in
particular are operating. The dynamics changed profoundly even during
the 21 years I was on the bench, with growing and extraordinary
pressures to deliver immediate returns to the market; the pressure to
squeeze other stakeholders, if necessary, to do that. Some people have
said, for example, “Well, the R&D is still kind of going strong.”
R&D actually is often reduced in places where activists go, but what
frequently happens is, if R&D is not cut, then worker’s pay is cut.
And there is offshoring and downsizing.
Look at what happened in terms of the lack of resiliency of
companies in the face of the pandemic because they didn’t have the kind
of reserves to even weather a month without laying off workers or
stiffing their creditors. If you talk about the brittle supply chains—our
prior panel, I agree wholeheartedly except, I would just say to my
friends, David and Lisa, stop burying the workers in the “S” of ESG:
Call it EESG. The workers deserve their own letter, and it’s not
surprising they haven’t had their own letter because investors, frankly,
haven’t cared that much about workers. It took really the 2016 election
and things like Brexit for people to start understanding that the fabric of
our nation has been torn and the social compact violated in a way that is
not sustainable. That’s why the statements by the Business Roundtable
(“BRT”)3 and people like Mr. Fink, which I support, both of those
directions—those are symptoms of the real illness. They are not on the
vanguard of history, they are responding to the realities of growing
economic insecurity and inequality and its threats to our society, and
their own businesses.
The BRT and the Council of Institutional Investors (“CII”) are
reacting belatedly to an imbalanced corporate governance structure that
can be summarized in this simple way.4 Stockholder power: envision
a big arrow going hugely up, and then stakeholders’ power, see another
3. See generally Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to
Promote “An Economy That Serves All Americans,” BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19,
2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purposeof-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc/7DRK-9CLQ].
4. Council of Institutional Investors Responds to Business Roundtable’s Statement
on Corporate Purpose, COUNCIL INST. INVS. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.cii.org/
aug19_brt_response [https://perma.cc/48K8-DV5T].
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arrow but going way down, particularly for workers. When that
happens, it’s natural that more wealth flows to the group with power and
comes out of the share of those who have lost power.
For a long time, I have written about the need to rebalance this, to
require institutional investors to align their interest with the interest of
their worker investors whose capital they hold, to constrain businesses
from polluting our economy and regulatory system and denuding the
protections for stakeholders. My recent work is really just pulling that
together.
The larger piece about fair and sustainable capitalism came because
a bunch of policymakers sort of said, “Leo, could you pull together all
the different strands in one place?” So I tried to do that. But it’s really
been a longstanding passion of mine. What I saw in the Court of
Chancery and in the Supreme Court is the power dynamics that that put
all the pressure on the operating companies and their fiduciaries to
squeeze the lemon for the institutional investors who control them.
These are the companies that make real products, they deliver real
services and they employ people. We really don’t and won’t have shared
accountability on the part of the institutional investor segment until we
bring their responsibilities into alignment with the interests of their longterm worker-investors, and, frankly, restore the promise of the New
Deal and European social democracy.
We’re going to have too many externalities, we’re going to treat
workers poorly, we’re not going to confront things like climate change,
and we’re going to be poorer for it because it does not foster sustainable
economic growth for companies to compete on regulatory arbitrage and
externalities, rather than on what the dimension should be: which is real
innovation and quality. So, that’s some more context than maybe you
want, but I’m pleased to see people finally talking about workers.
As I said, however, it’s not coincidental that the workers are buried
in the “S.” I would challenge anybody to look at sustainability
conferences over the last 10 years. Until maybe the last year or two
I didn’t even hear much of a mention of workers, living wages, or the
fair treatment of them. It was all pretty much through an investor lens.
I think it took the murder of Mr. Floyd for investors to finally focus on
racial inequality. The institutional investors and folks on the
sustainability front were doing some stuff around gender inequality, but
you can question why they weren’t focusing on race until 2020, because
the statistics were grimmer for Black people by far than for women.
I have always supported doing something about both, and it’s good they
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are finally taking that position too. They were not doing anything about
wage inequality until some of the things I mentioned, and I hope they
will do something now.
I think when corporate America has taken another round of
government bailouts—bailouts that have been hugely helpful to the
money manager community by the way—and when we have seen that
the essential worker class has been treated so poorly, I think we are at a
moment where maybe we can rebalance things fundamentally. I have
been hoping this moment would come a while back. I would applaud,
for example, the people at the Aspen Business and Society program.
If you look at their reports5—and I played a role in authoring them going
back into the first decade of this century—they were talking about many
of the same issues as the folks at B Lab.6
As you know, our friends in corporate law academia are still
obsessed with sell-side takeover premiums, and things like that. I don’t
think we in corporate law have had a very wide lens as a community on
the effect of corporations on society and the effect of institutions on how
corporations behaved. I think it’s long overdue that there’s conferences
like this, by distinguished institutions like Fordham that actually focus
on things that matter to real people.
PROF. GRIFFITH: Thank you. It seems to me, if I can characterize
one of the big ideas that comes through in your recent work: it is to add
that extra letter to the front or to take the employees out of the “S,” as
you said, and so to make it about EESG and not just about ESG. That
seems to me consistent, as you said, with some of the things that you
have written about in the past.
Is there anything different now? You mentioned in passing the
Business Roundtable statement7 by the CEOs of the largest companies

5. See generally ASPEN INST., AMERICAN PROSPERITY PROJECT: A NONPARTISAN
FRAMEWORK FOR LONG-TERM INVESTMENT (Dec. 2016), https://www.aspeninstitute.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/American-Prosperity-Project_Policy-Framework_
FINAL-1.3.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LNA-JNF2]; ASPEN INST., LONG TERM VALUE
CREATION: PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS (June 2007),
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/files/content/docs/bsp/
FinalPrinciples.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL7K-4PDQ].
6. See, e.g., B LAB & S’HOLDER COMMONS, FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO
STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM: A POLICY AGENDA FOR SYSTEMS CHANGE 13–15 (2020),
https://theshareholdercommons.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/From-ShareholderPrimacy-to-Stakeholder-Capitalism-TSC-and-B-Lab-White-Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D6FZ-LCH3].
7. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 3.

344

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVI

in America that we should stop focusing on shareholder wealth
maximization as the most important thing for corporate law. We’ve
heard things like that in the past, of course, when the debate about
employees was often about manager-employee. Managers would
squeeze employees in connection with takeovers, they would seek
takeovers to maximize golden parachutes or something like this and
employees would get the short end of the stick as you alluded to. Your
suggestion now is that we’re in a different EESG space. I guess one of
my questions is, do we really trust the Business Roundtable—this group
of managers—to take care of employee issues, and if not, what’s
different now?
HON. STRINE: I have never thought that America should just trust
the elite to do this. I was very appreciative of the Business Roundtable’s
statement. I think it was quite useful. I would say that the Chair at the
time, Mr. Dimon, runs a company that is basically Delaware’s largest
private sector employer now. I must say, they pay very good wages to
people at all levels of the company. They contribute to charities in the
community and we’re very lucky to have them in Delaware. So it seems
to be a company that on that dimension, in many ways, is walking the
talk. But do I think that you leave it to business alone? No, and I
certainly wouldn’t leave it to the institutional investors, either. I don’t
actually think it was public company managers who wanted to squeeze
labor the most. I think they were told by institutional investors, “You
better d–mn well do that or you won’t have your job,” and their pay was
tied to total stock return. The labor costs, an area where the institutional
investor community and the stock analyst community puts really strong
pressures on companies. What’s different now is that it’s not
sustainable, people are not going to take it anymore. It’s causing racial
and ethnic divisions because nativists are using the economic insecurity
of white working people to divide us along lines about immigration and
race. We are failing to close the race gap.
In terms of creating investor pools to sustain pension funds or
retirement funds, if people do not get paid fairly, they cannot save for
retirement. It is also not true, and I think it is really important to
understand this, that the wage stagnation cannot be blamed on the
workforce itself. The American worker is more educated than ever,
more adaptable than ever. It is total bull that there’s been some
Darwinian evolution among money managers and CEOs in the last 50
years, where they become immeasurably smarter and deserve more of
the pie. Almost every profession has more education requirements than
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it used to. It’s not just people who are working class who have been
hit—skilled professionals have seen their wages stagnate. It’s not
because there hasn’t been more productivity and growth, it’s because the
share of productive growth that has been taken by the top is huge. They
have eaten all the new pie, and we need to go back to where there is fair
gain-sharing. I think you can’t just say “we got it now, we understand,”
because the businesspeople who want to do it right—the institutional
investors who want to do it right—will then be undercut. You need a
level playing field and government must set that.
Anybody who plays sports knows that if the referee doesn’t rule the
game and enforce the rules, then at the end of the game, you’re up to the
level of the most sportsmanlike competitors. The most sportsmanlike
people are probably kicking people from behind in order to survive. So
we need to restore a regulatory framework of fair stakeholder protection
within which all companies compete, and in the institutional investor
sector, we need to do the same so that they all have to focus. It is the
opposite of what Secretary of Labor Scalia is doing. We need to go in
the opposite direction and make sure that institutional investors actually
have to align their voting and their stewardship with the real interest of
human investors, which requires taking into account EESG.8
On workers in particular, there is absolutely no question that we
cannot go back to a fair economy unless we restore the real promise of
minimum wage laws and set a floor under bargaining. If we do not
restore worker leverage in the form of revitalizing the ability to really
join a union and bargain, we will not get there. We need to also
experiment with other forms of worker voice, another reason I believe
some reform within corporate law is critical to make sure every large
company, public or private, has a board committee focused on the wellbeing and pay of the workforce as a whole, and not just top
management. One of the real problems with just relying on external
reform—if you look at the early part of the century, I was more inclined
to say, let’s leave to external regulation the protection of all other
stakeholders, and to say don’t pretend that corporate managers can
balance all these things because you might weaken the force to get labor
law reform or environmental reform done. But I realized that you
couldn’t get where you needed without rebalancing within corporate law
itself. The problem is Lewis Powell and Milton Friedman and the
8. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in
Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock 62–
63 (Columbia L. Ctr. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 637, 2020).
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consequences of their thinking and its success: They told corporations to
focus just on profits for stockholders and to go to war on the regulatory
protections for other stakeholders, and that is what happened.9
For 50 years, there’s been a use of corporate treasury funds and
influence to actually pollute the regulatory framework in which
corporations operate to systematically go after stakeholder protection,
such as union rights and environmental protection. I am now convinced
that if you do not deal with the power dynamics within corporate
governance itself, in a binding way that you actually cannot get the kind
of externality regulation that you want. Ideally, you do want labor law to
protect workers, and you want environmental regulation to do it. You
want corporate law to stick more to its own knitting, but if we have
changed the corporate power dynamics—such that companies are under
pressure to really deny climate change, to block environmental
regulation, to block living wage legislation, to impede the ability to
actually join a union, to undercut consumer laws, we basically destroyed
the fuller conception of what antitrust was to do in our economy—then
in order to rebalance that we actually have to temper corporate political
influence and focus corporate governance on fairness to all stakeholders.
There is a role for regulation there in that process as well.
PROF. GRIFFITH: I want to get to your specific corporate
governance ideas. Before we leave the big picture of employment
question, I just had to follow-up on the remarks that you just made. You
touched on “competition is global.” The question is—aren’t product
markets global markets? Every time I turn on Bloomberg radio in the
morning, they are talking about automation, how automation is the next
thing, and how if you thought outsourcing was bad, wait until
automation happens. Turning to jobs, there is no such thing as a job
anymore, including for fancy law professors like myself. One question
is, how can anyone deal with that if there is always an incentive for
some other competitor in the product market who might not be . . .
HON. STRINE: You are absolutely right, but here it is a question
of how we deal with that. People forget that historically, the New Deal
in many ways was the nationalization of our regulatory structure,
9. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782–83 (1978); see
also Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine–The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/
09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html
[https://perma.cc/632Q-UY7A].
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intended to keep up with an already nationalized economy. We already
had commerce flowing across state lines. We had implications for our
entire society, and we had no effective national regulatory structures to
deal with them.
In terms of international marks, it was Roosevelt’s vision and
Churchill’s that the postwar trading blocs that were established would
actually embed the core provisions of the New Deal in which the New
Deal in many ways inspired European social democracy.10 Clement
Attlee and other folks borrowed from the New Deal. The post-War
trading regimes were supposed to embed protections, not just for
mobilized capital, but for workers and the environment. Product market
pressures actually have already grown enormously, which is why what
we did in the United States to make companies much more focused
solely on stockholders made no sense. What I mean by that is, this idea
that companies were not as subject to market pressures as they should
be, and that we had to make them much more responsive
to stockholders, ignored the huge pressure that you mentioned from
international competition.
Part of one of my articles I wrote back in the early part of the
century is about two “Friedmen”—about Milton Friedman, about Tom
Friedman, and about the need to actually take the New Deal,11 to kind of
knit it together OECD-wide, so that competition is not on the wrong
dimensions and we don’t encourage labor arbitrage or tax havens, the
inversion wave, but competition in a way that promotes virtuous cycles.
Then in the developing world. We understand that what is a living
wage may be different, but the same concept of a living wage, the same
concept of safe worker conditions, the same concept of being able
to join a union, the same concept of no child labor, that those things
would be extended there. It is often implied that it is all globalization
that has caused wage stagnation and increased inequality; that it’s not
really about what is going on in the United States itself.
The problem with that is the evidence is just to the contrary.
Lawrence Mishel at EPI has done the real leading work on this and
academics need to give him more credit. He has been the one shedding

10. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Made for This Moment: The Enduring
Relevance of Adolf Berle’s Belief in a Global New Deal, 42 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 267
(2019).
11. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the
Implications of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behavior, 58
UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 241, 274 (2008).
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the most light for the longest time on the change and gain sharing and
the American economy.12 But Larry Summers and Professor [Anna]
Stansbury—I don’t know if you’ve seen their piece this summer—
but it isolates the U.S. effect, looking at globalization and looking at
what matters.13 Their conclusion is that there’s much greater growth in
inequality than in equality. So there’s more imbalance in the United
States, there is more wealth disparity than in the OECD, and what
explains it is those two arrows I talked about. The United States has
been the place where stockholder power has gone up the most and where
worker voice and leverage has gone down the most. It is that—and not
globalization—which is the key; it is that change in the distributional
split. It is what happens when companies in the United States are
successful, what share goes to which constituency—that really is what is
driving U.S. inequality.
I would just make a point that Germany and Scandinavia have been
pretty successful in the international product markets.14 Every rich
person I know has all kinds of fancy products from these “horrible
socialist economies” in Scandinavia and Germany. These “crappy
economies” somehow make these precision goods, and continue to do so
in the face of global competition, even though they have
co-determination with workers’ councils from the ground up, workers
on boards at the top, and stakeholder forms of corporate governance.
So I don’t doubt that we need to globalize our approaches. What I think,
however, that we have to globalize is the thing we’re proud of, and the
thing we’re proud of is an approach to a market economy that defeated
communism, defeated fascism, and showed that a market economy
could work for the benefit of the many. What we have been doing
is allowing ourselves to erode the protections and the things that mean
the most to our societies by having a global trading regime that only
12. See generally Lawrence Mishel, Lynn Rhinehart & Lane Windham, Explaining
the Erosion of Private-Sector Unions, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/private-sector-unions-corporate-legalerosion [https://perma.cc/VXW8-5UUF].
13. See generally Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining
Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American
Economy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27193, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27193/w27193.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WSR-9NKA].
14. See Kathleen Thelen, Transitions to the Knowledge Economy in Germany,
Sweden, and the Netherlands, 51 COMPAR. POL. J. 295, 295–96 (2019).
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really values mobilized capital, and that allows a nation like China,
which is playing a mercantilist fascist game at best, to be a full
participant and to put downward pressure on the ability of our societies
to treat their stakeholders well.
I think we have to be hugely international going forward, but the
way we’d actually bring the United States much more into alignment
with the OECD would be to move in the direction that I’m talking about,
and folks like Professor Fairfax and Professor Webber are, because the
United States is actually more of an outlier than it is consistent with the
other market economies.
PROF. GRIFFITH: Let me shift our conversation, if you don’t
mind, to some of your specific corporate governance reform ideas, in
particular, to the reform idea around the compensation committee.15
One of your recent papers suggests that one way to accomplish the kind
of goals that you have just outlined would be through reconceiving the
role of the compensation committee of the board.16 Of course, normally
compensation committees are tasked with setting Chief Executive
Officer and another high-ranking officer pay. Under your conception,
they would do much more than that. In terms of figuring out a fair ratio
of pay for employees.
HON. STRINE: If you think about it—if you want the average
worker to make more, then the best way to do it is to put American
compensation committees on to that task. If there’s any group of people
who knows how to increase the pay of some group of people, it’s them.
Sean, I am joking, but not entirely. These people have been very good at
increasing pay of a small segment of people and of boards of directors.
So in terms of this, they know a lot about that. But yes, I do think that
they should have a broader role.
PROF. GRIFFITH: Let me ask you about this. In your paper, you
suggest that the board compensation committee needs to think not only
about executive pay, but also about employee pay.17 And for companies
that do outsourcing, then also the pay of the folks that are the inputs on
the supply chain—if there’s an outsourced supply chain for a big
company. This seems to me to be sort of a microcosm of the other

15. Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Kirby M. Smith, Toward Fair Gainsharing and a Quality
Workplace for Employees: How a Reconceived Compensation Committee Might Help
Make Corporations More Responsible Employers and Restore Faith in American
Capitalism, 76 BUS. LAW. 31, 31 (2020–21).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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constituencies’ stories that you were just outlining through the
compensation committee. In other words, the directors who are on the
compensation committee are no longer thinking primarily about
shareholders, as you suggested previously, but also about other
constituencies, at least in the sense of employees, and then maybe in the
context of extended supply chains of the folks who are . . .
HON. STRINE: Yes, although I would argue that they are also
thinking better for stockholders because if you have an extra $5 million
in compensation and you throw it at the C-suite, the top executives can
feel better when the New York Times report about CEO pay comes out
as they will rank higher. Or you can take those $5 million dollars and
reward a much broader class of workers in a way that is very meaningful
to them. What sort of productivity gains are you going to get out of that
for the company itself and therefore for stockholders, and for overall
economic growth? Seems likely to be greater. That sort of distribution is
also more likely to create strong product and service markets that creates
overall growth. I would actually say it is a much more rational way of
doing business.
I am saying that it also is a much more rational way to set top
executive compensation, because you can better situate where you put
your dollars in terms of where they will have the most impact. Sadly,
I think many boards do not understand a lot about how they compensate
their workers. I think they also don’t understand a lot about groups of
people who are basically workers of the company, but through
contractors. For example, my wife is an occupational therapist at a
hospital. There’s been a group of people incredibly important to keeping
Americans safe and protecting lives during the pandemic: the people
who clean hospitals. Think about the people who have gone to work
every day during the pandemic. The people who clean the offices and
the buildings. Many of them do not work for the company that they
clean. They’re there in that facility every day. What do they get paid?
What does it mean for a company to have a commitment to living wages
if they have thousands of people who are essentially fundamental parts
of their supply chain on a regular basis who don’t get it? So, I think if
we actually want to create the right framework, the board itself has to be
involved.
I also think there are important issues like racial and gender pay
equity that get no board level attention. When you have a group of the
board that’s focused on compensation, why aren’t they taking a broader
human resources lens on this? Why aren’t they looking at things like
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#MeToo? In 2019, MeToo was important. Just because 2020 has been
so sad and weird doesn’t mean MeToo is not important. It’s really
important that you have a harassment free workplace on all kinds of
dimensions. Instead of finding out that there’s a problem when there’s a
crisis, instead of having situations where people who do the important
work of human resources, anti-discrimination in companies never
having a board committee that they have any regular access to, and
instead of companies talking about racial equity and inclusion and
talking about doing something about workers—how about having
a structure that actually supports and does something meaningful about
that?
Frankly, we have too many companies right now where the
compensation committee does all the compensation for the C-suite, does
all the compensation for the board, and then all the human resources
compliance issues go to the audit committee which has huge other tasks
to do, and is not necessarily skilled in any of these areas. There’s no
ability for the human resources people to get an adequate amount of
time because of the hard work that the audit committee has to do in its
core area.
This is a broader thing that we’re going to talk about—we’re not
using the board in a very business-like way to address how companies
affect society, where legal bite comes in because the company rubs up
against society and its stakeholders in certain ways, and to align the
corporate board and management reporting structures in a sensible way
and then come up with public metrics and other ways of measuring
progress that allow the board to set goals and also to communicate to the
public what companies are trying to do, for them to be held accountable,
and to get credit. It’s striking to me how little I think many boards
actually understand about their overall pay plan. I don’t want them to
get in the weeds. I don’t want them to set individuals’ pay.
But I do think it’s their responsibility to have a perspective on
important things like, “Are we committed to a living wage?” Look at
quartiles of who gets paid and then what categories of employees they
cover and if that is fair? How do we treat our contractors? And I will
also say this: the “U” word and boards—why is it that that’s not being
discussed there? What is our attitude towards unionization? Do we have
a board philosophy about that? Do we crush our American workers if
they try to unionize, while we accept unions in Scandinavia and
Germany because we know we have to? Those kinds of conversations
could be very helpful to go along with external constraints. To go back
a little bit, I think sectoral bargaining, for example, which Vice
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President Biden is recommending—that is also a tool that is used in
many market economies to reduce arbitrage against workers and
encourage competition on productivity and quality grounds. That is
something that could help businesses trying to do it right. So, I think this
is something that companies could do on their own, that would be very
business-like, and put them in a good position to address some of the
demands that people like Lisa Fairfax talked about for companies to
disclose in this area. It would enable companies to not just discuss
something like a MeToo problem for the first time when it’s on the front
page of the newspaper, but to actually be involved in making sure the
companies have really good policies that they actually walk the talk in
these areas. So that’s my idea.
I actually drew on the new movement in the UK that requires
something similar in terms of board level focus on these issues.18 It also
could be a way, if we get some experience and trust with this, where
American companies could experiment in a way that the labor
movement would support with forms of worker voice at companies that
are non-union companies. Almost like experimenting with works
councils. Because if you had a part of the board that was actually
charged with doing this fairly, it might be that the union movement
would trust that a little bit.
PROF. GRIFFITH: Well, it is interesting. It is very interesting.
In your remarks, you mentioned that paying workers better might
actually increase the productivity and the value of the product as well.
That reminded me of the old Dodge v. Ford case where Henry Ford is
on trial for being a traitor to his class for paying his workers $5 a week
instead of $2.50, and the obvious reason that he is doing that is to get a
sober regular workforce, so that he can run his assembly line.19 And so,
it seems like the way to increase productivity and profit potentially . . .
HON. STRINE: Well, right, and that’s why companies like Google
serve—if you have ever been lucky enough to go the Google cafeteria
for lunch or dinner, Taco Tuesday is pretty spectacular there, Thai
18.
19.

Id. at 42–43.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 683 (1919) (“My ambition, said Mr.
Ford, is to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the
greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this
we are putting the greatest share of our profits back in the business.”) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Lee Schafer, Ford Case Defined Role of Business, STAR
TRIBUNE (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.startribune.com/schafer-ford-case-defined-roleof-business/491505831 [https://perma.cc/Y7MC-CEAQ].
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Thursday, the Coq Au Vin—I mean, they have got really great health
and food facilities. They’re doing that, in part, because it inspires
people. Henry Ford had maybe less savory motives, as we both know.
I mean, well, he made those jobs horrible. People who were used to
complex jobs on farms. I mean, being a farmer was hard work, but it
was really interesting. Very diverse things farmers do, as you know, and
then you are on an assembly line. So, if you don’t pay those people well,
they quit. Ford’s problem in that case against the Dodge brothers is that
he confessed and claimed he only raised wages to help workers and
society.20 He didn’t really fess up that it was all also great for
stockholders to do that because he was branding and enhancing his and
his company’s reputation. I mean, he also wanted to sell products and a
lot more of them, and higher wages in society created more consumers
for his cars.
This is another thing, consumers like to feel good about companies
they buy products and services from. My other basic point is—just
a distributional point—that if you have a certain pool of money that you
are going to give out in compensation, how you allocate it could have a
different effect on productivity as well. Giving extra millions to
somebody who is not going to spend it, who already has more than
plenty; as opposed to giving it to people for whom it really matters, and
where they feel valued, and where you can help 50 to 100 to 1000
people. I often tell directors to remember that another million dollars for
the C-Suite is a thousand $1,000 bonus checks that just appear at the
beginning of June and everybody says, “We know this maybe can’t fund
your entire vacation, but we hope it helps you or your family in some
meaningful way.”
How much pep does that put in the step of 1000 people? What if
you take it to $5 million? We haven’t really thought about that, and I do
not think that it will be so negative for the stockholders we really care
about—who are the diversified investors, who are “long” investors and
depend on our whole economy’s growth, not that of any particular
company. I actually think—you mentioned a bit about CEOs and things
like that—I think a lot of CEOs would rather feel good that they are
treating the people that come to work with them every day well, and
there is a lot of investor pressure on them now not to do that.
I also think while we are talking about EESG, I feel—and I have
felt strongly for a long time—that boards just are not allocating their
responsibilities in a businesslike way, they are still sticking everything
20.

See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919).
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they do into the audit committee. In a couple recent cases in Chancery,
companies really get caught out.21 One got the case dismissed, but the
CEO got fired over the scandal.22 The other one, the case is going to full
discovery.23
People like Dr. Fauci can’t even serve on the compliance
committee of many food and pharma companies. Do you know why?
Because he probably would say, I’m not really an accounting expert and
if I have to serve on the audit compliance committee, that is not real
comfortable for me. But we don’t care if we have a former high-level
KPMG accountant or a CFO dealing with environmental risk or product
safety risk or pharmaceutical risk or human resource risk that is really
alien to them and in which they have no expertise. We don’t care that
we’re having a line to the audit committee and key professionals in the
environmental product, safety, and human resources spaces who have no
regular time with the board. It’s just long overdue to fix this, and it’s
really sensible for companies to identify what the risks are.
How you affect society is going to line up with where you have
legal risks because of how legal risk comes in—the law regulates
companies where they affect society. That is where you have
stakeholder concerns. The “E,” called environmental, should not be in
two different places in your company. You shouldn’t rotely stick the

21. Nicholas D. Mozal & David A. Seal, Three Is Not a Trend: Another Caremark
Claim Survives a Motion to Dismiss, But Does Not Reflect Change in the Law, HARV.
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 27, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/
05/27/three-is-not-a-trend-another-caremark-claim-survives-a-motion-to-dismiss-butdoes-not-reflect-a-change-in-the-law [https://perma.cc/32S8-TDEM]; Kevin LaCroix,
Another Delaware Breach of the Duty of Oversight Case Survives Dismissal Motion,
D&O DIARY (May 5, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/05/articles/directorand-officer-liability/another-delaware-breach-of-the-duty-of-oversight-case-survivesdismissal-motion [https://perma.cc/DB5H-MU69].
22. See Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Judge Refuses to Toss McDonald’s Lawsuit Seeking
to Clawback More Than $37 Million From Fired CEO Steve Easterbrook, CHI.
TRIBUNE (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-mcdonaldseasterbrook-motion-to-dismiss-denied-20210203-ckkjkcp4tvdw7a3baqwyhydsxastory.html [https://perma.cc/EUL3-KJ6P].
23. Pettry v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. CV 2020-0132-KSJM, 2020 WL 6870461 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 24, 2020), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2020); see also William Savitt, Sarah
K. Eddy & Cynthia Fernandez Lumermann, Section 220 as Pre-Complaint Discovery–
Recent Developments, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/15/section-220-as-pre-complaint-discoveryrecent-developments [https://perma.cc/T78P-9DY8].
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“E” for EESG purposes in nominating corporate governance.
And “E” for environmental legal compliance in audit, if environmental
risk is central to your product line. You probably have an industryspecific risk committee that handles all elements of that “E,” integrating
related compliance, EESG, and risk management efforts efficiently.
Then you concentrate financial risk in the audit committee. With a more
rational committee structure, you will be able to use diversity in all its
meanings there, because you will actually get to situate talent on the
board that you really need to run your business. You will be able to put
diverse expertise on the board and you will have reporting relationships
that make sense. Then you should align your reporting standards and
have the correct committees use them to monitor progress.
One of the real challenges for the prior panel, in terms of what they
were talking about the whole day, is that companies don’t know how to
efficiently address these demands. Part of what I’m saying is, think like
businesspeople. Align what you are doing with what you seek to
accomplish, and make sure you have an allocation of talent and time
management that really tracks your key business risks, which are going
to track identically with how you affect society.
PROF. GRIFFITH: Chief Justice, the organizers are tickling me in
the chat box to wrap it up, but I do want to ask you one more question.
You alluded at the very beginning to the B Lab—I don’t know if you
mentioned their white paper, but you alluded to B Lab and our common
friend Rick Alexander—and they recently put out a white paper24 that
suggests that a number of the types of reforms that you have been
talking about ought to be written into federal law. In fact, they write out
a fairly elaborate statutory rewrite for different places where ESG or
perhaps EESG could be a recognized in federal law using the
international interstate commerce clause as a way to get into federal
law.25 So my last question for you, and it can be as brief or as long as
you would like, should these things be mandatory or written into federal
law by the new administration?
HON. STRINE: I think some of them should be. I actually have
a comprehensive bill version of my paper on fair and sustainable
capitalism that talks about requirements for double ESG disclosure
giving the SEC an updated mandate that would allow them and require
24. Frederick H. Alexander, Putting Benefit Corporation Statutes Into Context by
Putting Context Into the Statutes, S’HOLDER COMMONS (July 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3648137 [https://perma.cc/84HV-E99B].
25. Id.
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them to consult with agencies like the EPA and the Department of Labor
to develop metrics,26 because I think the SEC rightly feels like it should
get more of a view from subject matters expertise on those subjects.
I also propose extending the SEC’s mandate to require EESG disclosure
from large private companies. They shouldn’t have to disclose
everything about their independent directors or the things that are just
relevant to investors, but they should have to disclose EESG
performance on a level playing field basis.
We have private large companies that pose real risks to workers, to
the environment, and to others, and they should not get a free pass on no
public disclosure. We have already reduced the number of public
companies and thus our window in the economy. We can’t continue in
that direction sustainably and so I think that granting the SEC authority
to require large private companies to disclose EESG metrics is clearly
an area needing Federal action. I also think there needs to be a lot of
action on the institutional investor front to have corresponding
disclosure requirements for institutional investors around EESG that
would match up with the requirement for operating companies. Then
make sure that we bring 13-D disclosure into the 21st century by
covering derivatives, requiring disclosure or cease trading at 5%, and
10b-5 liability for trading by fellow wolves before the lead wolf goes
public.
On the benefit corporation model, Delaware has been a leader and
I pushed Delaware. My friend Rick was originally an opponent, so he
has been a bit of a Saul on the road to Damascus.27 Rick is a wonderful
person, one of the best corporate lawyers in the nation, and I am proud
to call him a friend; same with Andrew Kassoy and Jay Gilbert. I am not
averse to a mandate to benefit corporate governance at the federal level,
as long as it is done through State law. I think it is totally unworkable as
a federal level corporate form. I do not think Federal courts are ready to
do fiduciary enforcement. I don’t think it’s their wheelhouse. I don’t
think there is a need for that cost. I think that there is a range of interest
in Congress and benefit corporations for people like Senator Warren,

26. LEO E. STRINE, JR., TOWARD FAIR AND SUSTAINABLE CAPITALISM, ROOSEVELT
INST. 8–9 (Aug. 2020), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/RI_
TowardFairandSustainableCapitalism_WorkingPaper_202008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YB2H-T3PT].
27. Acts 9:3–6 (King James).
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who would go the whole hog and would require it, to people more in the
center, like Senator Warner from Virginia—who I have a lot of respect
for, like I have respect for Senator Warren—but he has been more
concerned about the “carrot” than a mandate; he would create some
incentives for these things. So a lot of my friends in the B Lab and
I have been largely in sync on this.
I think what we’re also saying is: if you imagine George Martin
producing the Beatles—if he’s moving a bunch of knobs, but not any
one knob in a radical direction, but he’s moving a lot of knobs in a way
that’s harmonious and produces the outcome you want—that’s what you
got to look for in corporate governance reform. Part of what I think the
B Lab people and I are focused on is, what can we do to make all public
and large private companies align their interests more with sustainable
wealth creation for their stockholders and fair treatment of stakeholders.
And in the institutional investor space, how do we make sure their
interests are similarly aligned, and then what kind of things can we do to
protect our political process in the same way? For example, I support
requiring stockholder approval of political spending because I think that
will make it go away as no stockholders will vote for it. I think, by the
way, most businesses don’t want to give, but they’re coerced into giving
and they would like to be able to be say no. The investment policies, for
example, I heard David telling. I have been a huge proponent, and
worked for years with Aspen, and other people worked on these ideas.
We didn’t call it the Green New Deal but we were talking about
investments to tackle climate change, to create jobs, to invest in basic
research and things that are a win-win for the productive economy and
American workers.
I do think that next year, it could be a really critical year, and
I would love to see a 21st century New Deal, even more, I’d like to see a
global 21st century New Deal where on things like climate change, on
deterring speculation and encouraging long term investment, we actually
work with our OECD colleagues together to build worker protections
and environmental protections into the world trading bloc to deal with
exactly the international pressures you were talking about. So count me
a big yes for the need for appropriate government regulation.
What I would say to my friends in the business and institutional
investor community, is that you recognize that this sort of rebalancing is
not at all radical, that it’s actually a restoration of the consensus that
made our economies and made us proud because we defeated fascism
and communism, and we spread the blessings and prosperity more
widely. If we restore that, we can close the racial equality gap. We can
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create more economic security, and we can tackle climate change.
Business communities are going to be more respected, the institutional
investment community will prosper and have more clients, and we’ll
have a better future. If there’s resistance to change on sensible lines,
what I fear is increased divisiveness, nativism, and ultimately the
pressure for more extreme solutions that may not look like something
like the win-win approach of the New Deal that harnessed market forces
and government regulation in a way that was productive for everyone.
Absent support from business elites for a constructive agenda of
that kind, I think we could end up with overreach and Balkanization
among our economic allies that we will greatly regret. So it is vital how
business reacts next year and whether they align their political actions
with the positive attitude they have expressed in the BRT statement, the
institutional investor community’s recent reaction to the need to address
inequality along racial and economic lines. If they walk that talk next
year, then I think we’re going to be in a very good place as a nation.
If they don’t, then I fear that things will go to a very negative place.
I am modestly hopeful and it is a real time for positive action to create
a fairer economy.
Sorry for keeping everybody away from their martini and beer
on Friday night.
PROF. GRIFFITH: Thanks very much. I am going to turn it over
to John Torabi to wrap us up.

